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New vitality in procedural due process requires a fresh
attitude and this article offers such an alternative. 1 Procedural
development has evolved as far as possible with the current
balancing approach whereby the "state's" interest is traded
against that of its individual citizens. This new attitude starts
with the recognition that the state is a reflection of the
community it serves. In our society, the community has an
overarching interest in the way it treats its individual members.
The process whereby decisions are made reflects the community's
commitment to fundamental principles as surely as do the
substantive outcomes of those decisions. Procedural due process
is thus a community imperative, and to approach it as a trade off
1. Frequently cited authorities:
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976).

T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917
(1988).
CHARLES KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE

(2d ed. 1997).
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between the community and the community's individual
members misconstrues the task.
The first step is to move beyond ''balancing'' as the dominant
strategy for procedural design. Balancing's instinct for trading
important interests against each other starts procedural due
process down the wrong analytical path. Moreover, balancing
tends towards ad hoc decisionmaking in which prior learning is
not easily applied to new tasks. In lieu of balancing, this article
recommends a broader system of principles, whereby prior
experience can be combined with empirical analysis and
decisionmaking theory to guide a creative and dynamic evolution
of general and specific procedural design principles.
Unlike balancing, this system will be founded on an instinct
to coordinate important values. It will be based on the
fundamental common interests of the community and its
individual members. It will search for procedural designs that
optimize service to both the community's interests and those of
the community's individual members. Coordination rather than
adverseness must be the driving force.
To guide the development of this coordinating system,
various procedural design factors are interpreted to reflect the
commonality between the community and its members. The costs
and the potential effectiveness of a procedural design are of
interest to both community and individual, and hence these basic
factors are explored as they are fundamental to developing
procedural designs that serve all interests. Both the community
and its members are concemed about the substantive impact of
such procedural designs, and that concem is reflected in the
design so as to incorporate both categories of interests.
Maintenance of the community itself is a fundamental goal
behind procedural design, and this design must recognize that
the individual members, particularly those directly affected by
the relevant community program, are intimately concemed with
the vitality of the community that serves them. The community
depends on individual members' acceptance of its process for
decisions, particularly the acceptance of those directly affected.
Thus, the design must rest on values such as satisfaction,
cultural imperatives and tradition, dignity, equality, and
consistency.
These factors offer points of sensitivity to be applied in
actual procedural design. In application, as in concept, the goal
remains to coordinate in procedural design the community's
interests with those of its individual members. These factors
then provide a context for the coordination of these major
categories of interests. Thus, this article suggests three
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application levels. At the most basic level, these factors
determine the relative weight of the procedural design issues
within the bundle of issues, both procedural and substantive,
before the decisionmaker. Secondly, it suggests how these
factors might be captured in categories of similar procedural
tasks so that future procedural designs can take advantage of
prior experience and study. Lastly, this article concedes that in
application some interests may demand priority over others,
but suggests that consideration of all the points of sensitivity
will assure that concession to special demands will still
optimize all interests.
Because design will necessarily be affected by the designers'
perspective, the design's application must include consideration
of how those perspectives might manifest themselves and
perhaps be adjusted by this approach. Here, it is recognized that
while much of procedural-design thinking revolves around
constitutional principles, learning is and should be applied to
statutory and administrative procedural design efforts. Thus, the
system of principles must guide designers primarily concerned
with broad community interests, such as legislators or
administrators, as well as those evaluating the procedural design
in the context of an individual application-the courts. Here, the
points of sensitivity should assure that both categories of
designers understand the full range of values embedded in the
procedural design and strive to optimize all of the interests at
stake.
Our culture demands that government, as the executor of
community goals, treat its citizens fairly. This cultural
imperative should drive procedural due-process analysis. The
search is for a system that treats procedural fairness as an
overarching community demand from government. Only through
fair process can government serve community desires. Hence, the
"state's interest" must reflect the individual interests of all
community members. This article hopes to establish a system of
principles that realizes this goal.

I.

THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE IN THE DUE PROCESS
CALCULUS

A. Context

The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution provide the fundamental source
whereby judicial interpretation has evolved, especially in the last
quarter of the twentieth century, into a sophisticated procedural
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jurisprudence. An explosion in procedural innovation began with
the 1970 Supreme Court opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly. 2 Goldberg
created a new sense of property from which grew a "considerable
progeny."3 Quickly, a "new" liberty interest was added to this
"new'' property interest.4 Still, the principles for defining these
new categories of due process interests needed development, and
over the years the Court has engaged itself in the task of evolving
a body oflaw defining the categories of interests protected by the
due process clauses.5
2. 397 U.S. 254, 261, 264 (1970) (holding that welfare recipients had a right to
a full evidentiary hearing prior to a termination of benefits). The majority found that
the benefits constituted "statutory entitlement[s,]" and that the termination
decisions adjudicated "important rights." See id. at 262. The Court relied on two law
review articles written by Charles Reich. See id. at 262 n.8 (approving of Reich's
analysis). The first article cited by the Court was Charles A Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255
(1965) (arguing that all classes of citizens, save the poor, have their entitlements
enforced in forms such as franchises, professional licenses, union membership,
employment contracts, pension programs, and stock options). The second was
Charles A Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964) (proposing that
those receiving government entitlements should have a complete ownership right in
the receipts). Thus, the property interest protected by the due process clauses was
made to cover any entitlement or benefit provided by the government.
3. See Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing,» 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1273 (1975). A new cycle of interest in the procedures used by governments seems
underway. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the
1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1973, 1973, 1988, 1989, 1991 (1996) (suggesting that a
counterrevolution is upon us, in which due process coverage in the areas of
prisoners' rights, welfare benefits, and social security benefits will be severely cut).
But see Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution» and "Reform»: Procedural Due
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 591, 592 (1998) (rejecting
Pierce's prediction). Comprehensive legislative consideration of administrative
procedure also increased in the recent congresses with a variety of bills introduced to
revise federal administrative procedure. See id. at 597-99, 618-20 (discussing the
Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act).
4. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) ("Where a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.").
Although the broader sense of the liberty interest has become firmly established, the
Court has constrained the most generous versions. See also Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (declaring that due process is violated when a state "imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life"); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976) (observing that an interest is
protected only where "a right or status previously recognized by state law was
distinctly altered or extinguished").
5. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (holding that
notwithstanding the lack of an express contractual right to renew a contract, an
employee may be entitled to a hearing if the rules and practices of the institution
provide a legitimate claim to contract renewal); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972) (finding that property rights "are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law"). A new property interest depends on whether a standard must be
applied before the action may be taken. To give the source of the interest its
broadest possible connotation, it has ultimately come to be called a "substantive
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The Goldberg expansion precipitated a second, and in many
ways more challenging, inquiry into procedural design. As the
Court observed immediately after Goldberg: "Once it is determined
that due process applies, the question remains what process is
due."6 That question presents a court with a wide range of
alternatives. 7 In the bedrock tum-of-the-century case of Londoner
v. City of Denver, setting the foundation for the right to a hearing,
the Court concluded: "Many requirements essential in strictly
judicial proceedings may be dispensed with . . . . [A] hearing in its
very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the
right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if
need be, by proof, however informal.',s In another classic due
process opinion, the Court observed: ''The very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation."9 The decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly was criticized as retreating from this notion of
flexibility and substituting trial-like procedures as a due-process
norm. 10 Soon after Goldberg, however, the Court reaffirmed its
commitment to procedural flexibility in Goss v. Lopez. 11
Given the wide spectrum of legitimate procedural moves, a
strategy was needed for determining what or how much
procedure would be necessary for any given process. That
predicate." See 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at 79. This approach is not so uniformly
applied in the search for new liberty. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995),
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the "substantive predicate" approach. See id. at
483-84, 486 (limiting the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in a
prison setting to circumstances that "impose[] atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life"). Justice Breyer,
however, preferred to continue the approach unless the interest was so fundamental
as to carry its own protection or so ordinary as to warrant no constitutional
protection. See id. at 493 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that a state must comply
with due process if the state effectuates a severe change in condition, or if the state
acts outside of its power).
6. Morrisseyv. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
7. See id. ("It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require
citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.").
8. 210 u.s. 373, 386 (1908).
9. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (opining that due process is a
flexible concept based upon history, reason, and democratic ideals).
10. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 1299-1301 (arguing that Justice Brennan,
after first noting that the required hearing need not be judicial or quasi-judicial in
nature, "demand[ed] almost all the elements of [a trial]").
11. 419 U.S. 565, 577-78, 581, 583 (1975) (declaring that although due process
requires a student facing a suspension from school to be given notice of the charges
against him and an opportunity to present his side, due process does not guarantee
such a student access to a judicial-like proceeding, whereby the student may have
counsel, or call or cross-examine witnesses).
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mechanism was provided by Justice Powell's opinion in Mathews
v. Eldridge. 12 The Court was asked to measure the adequacy of
the Social Security Administration's procedures for disability
decisions. 13 However, the applicability of the Due Process Clause
was not contested.14 The Court faced only the question of whether
the process was adequate. 15 In answering this question, Justice
Powell established a tese 6 that has dominated procedural design
ever since.17 He focused on three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 18
The Court intended this test to be "intensely practical,"19 and
it spawned a workable body of law. 20 The Mathews test
12. 424 u.s. 319 (1976).
13. See id. at 323, 335.
14. See id. at 332.
15. See id. at 334-35.
16. Seeid.
17. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554
(5th ed. 1995) (observing that all courts must use the Mathews balancing test to
determine if a government action violates due process).
18. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
19. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992) ("Application of this
balancing principle is 'intensely practicalO' because attention is directed to both the
nature of the clainl presented and the characteristics of the particular
administrative procedure provided.") (citations omitted).
20. A recent example of a pure Mathews approach is Gilbert v. Hamar, 520 U.S.
924 (1997). A campus police officer at a state university was suspended after a drug
charge. See id. at 926-27. The charges were dismissed but the suspension remained
in effect and the employee was demoted to groundskeeper. See id. at 927. The only
administrative process afforded to the officer was the opportunity to tell his side of
the story to university officials. See id. The Court balanced the employee's interest
against the State's. See id. at 931-32. The Court found that the severity, length, and
finality of the deprivation should all be considered. See id. at 932. Here, the Court
found that the loss of income and benefits constituted a "relatively insubstantial"
loss. See id. In contrast, it found that "the State has a significant interest in
immediately suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, employees who
occupy positions of great public trust and high public visibility, such as police
officers." Id. As to what it termed the "last factor in the Mathews balancing," the
Court concluded that pre-suspension process was not necessary because the arrest
and filing of charges against the respondent provided a reasonable basis for the
suspension: "[T]he purpose of any pre-suspension hearing would be to assure that
there are reasonable grounds to support the suspension without pay." Id. at 933-34.
The Court, however, remanded the case so that the lower courts could consider
whether the post-suspension process was adequate. See id. at 935-36.

642

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[37:635

implemented emerging perceptions of the legal process. 21
Further, it added considerable rationality and structure to
procedural design development, but still, it never quite "felt"
complete or satisfactory.
Mathews committed procedural design to balancing
analysis. 22 Although it lists three factors, the Mathews test rests
on two sets of balancing maneuvers. One undertakes a
cost/benefit analysis of additional and/or alternative procedures. 23
The other trades the "government's interest" against the "private
interest."24 As Mashaw observed a number of years ago, the
Mathews analysis is "implicitly utilitarian. "25 It creates a type of
The Supreme Court has also used the three-part Mathews test to determine
whether procedures comply with due process in private disputes. See, e.g.,
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 4 (1991) (holding that absent a showing of
extraordinary circumstances and a bond requirement, states are prohibited from
authorizing an ex parte, prejudgment attachment of real estate). The plaintiffs
interests are substituted in the third factor and balanced against the defendant's
interest with "due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in
providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater
protections." Id. at 11.
The Court has also applied the three factor Mathews test in criminal due
process cases. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 83 (1985) (requiring the
state to supply a psychiatrist). The criminal process, however, is quite consciously
unbalanced in favor of the individual interest even though community interests are
quite compelling and do, of course, prevail in many cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) ("We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent
benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial
cost of exclusion."). Therefore, the following critique of the Mathews balancing
approach may not apply in the criminal context. Although criminal procedure
questions may benefit from the following analysis, this discussion is not focused on
criminal procedures.
·
Of course, lower courts rationally apply the Mathews test. Some actually go
through the three factors. See, e.g., Stuart v. United States, 109 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th
Cir. 1997) (declaring that neither the land use regulation nor the statute violates
due process simply by permitting cancellation of a real estate contract without a
hearing).
21. Henry Hart had a tremendous influence on several generations' thinking
about the "legal process." Eskridge and Frickey reported: "Hart ... pressed his
students to think in cost-benefit terms: What is the objective, and is it socially
acceptable? What means will fairly and efficiently achieve the objective? Is the cost
reasonable given the value of the objective and the alternative means available?"
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107
HARv. L. REV. 2031, 2037 (1994). Can it be doubted that these teachings formed the
Mathews mentality?
22. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 994 (noting that Mathews is the foundation
for modern due process analysis).
23. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 39-40 (examining the Court's analysis of
existing and additional procedural safeguards).
24. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 981 ("Balancing opinions typically pit
individual against governmental interests.").
25. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 46-48 (arguing that Mathews is a utilitarianbased approach that finds a due process violation "only when alternative procedures
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social welfare function: "That function first takes into account the
social value at stake in a legitimate private claim; it discounts
that value by the probability that it will be preserved through the
available administrative procedures, and it then subtracts from
that discounted value the social cost of introducing additional
procedures."26 This utilitarian balancing itself is one source of the
unsatisfactory feel of the body of law that has evolved from
Mathews.
The cost/benefit approach promised a scientific foundation
for procedural design, but it has never really delivered on that
promise. To a large extent, the implementation of the
cost/benefit analysis is unsatisfactory because there is little
reliable information about the practical value of procedural
elements. For this reason, this Mathews operation leads to a
shallow analysis with judges making systemic procedural
decisions based on personal experience, tradition or mere bias.
While effectiveness must be part of the procedural design; and
an attempt to guide its use is offered below, scientific
foundation is not sufficiently developed to support conclusions
about how various procedural designs serve one category of
interest or another. Thus, the seemingly scientific measure
becomes solely a matter of judicial guesswork. 27 Absent the
necessary support, these judgments may as easily do harm as
good. This balancing maneuver is thus unsatisfactory because of
the lack of solid information about the costs and the benefits of
a procedure. This defect awaits the development of that
information. Here, the analysis attempts nothing more than to
incorporate the effectiveness question into the overall system. 28
The deeper source of disquiet is the tendency of Mathews
analysis to set state interests against those of the individual. 29
The perceived juxtaposition of these two categories of interests
has long been a part of due process jurisprudence.30 In the famous
would so substantially increase social welfare that their rejection seems irrational").
26. See id. at 47-48.
27. See, e.g., Stuart v. United States, 109 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1997) ("On
balance, the value of such a hearing in insuring accuracy is low, while the cost of
such a procedure is high.") (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)).
28. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1972) ("We now turn to the
nature of the process that is due, bearing in mind that the interest of both State and
parolee will be furthered by an effective but informal hearing.").
29. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, at 554 (noting that the Mathews
balancing test requires a balancing between the individual interests at stake and the
government interests in avoiding burdens stemming from increased procedural
requirements).
30. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 981 (explaining that the interests of the
individual and the government are often in opposition).
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1961 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers opinion, the Court
expressed: "[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may
require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action." 31 Mashaw found this "calculus"
inadequate because it ignores or undervalues some relevant and
important individual values.32 The utilitarian approach, however,
fails in more than completeness. As applied, this utilitarian
balancing invariably pits the benefit to the individual against the
cost to the community. Yet process has costs as well as benefits
for the individual and benefits as well as costs for the overall
system.33
Because of these shortcomings, the Mathews calculus must
be reconfigured so as to coordinate important interests. The
"government's interest" in this calculus is important only in
service to the community's interests and these interests of the
community's members cannot be seen as adverse. The
"government's interest" and the individual's interest should be
considered in tandem rather than set against each other.
Accordingly, this coordinating operation begins with recognizing
that the Mathews "government interest" embodies the entire
community's interests. This interest involves individuals' rights
and hence incorporates into the Mathews calculus a
responsiveness to all the interests bound up in a procedural
design. Thus, whatever affects the community's interests
necessarily affects the interests of the community's individuals.

B. Breaking Out of Balancing
Balancing is a flawed strategy for procedural design.
Aleinikoff concluded the following from a sample case applying
Mathews: "The opinion reflects both the dominance of balancing
in the contemporary judicial mind and its emptiness as a
methodology."34 Mathews balancing is not generally empty in
31. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961).
32. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 48 ("The Eldridge Court conceives of the
values of procedure too narrowly: it views the sole purpose of procedural protections
as enhancing accuracy, and thus linrits its calculus to the benefits or costs that flow
from correct or incorrect decisions.").
33. See id. (arguing that utilitarian balancing neglects both the value to society
inuring from proceedings and the costs to individuals for participating in the
proceedings).
34. Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 983 (referring to Justice Stewart's opinion in
Lassiter u. Department of Soc. Serus., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)).
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actual application, but it can lead to dangerously insensitive
analysis. In the procedural design context, the balancing strategy
acerbates the tendency to set important interests against each
other. These interests, however, are intertwined. Thus, a first
step in enhancing the framework for procedural design begins
with the realization that due process analysis must move beyond
balancing and towards a system that coordinates valuable
interests.
Balancing involves a decisional process whereby interests or
values are identified, evaluated, and ultimately measured in
relation to each other.35 Balancing, properly employed, gives
weight to all values. Generally, balancing may take two forms. 36
In one form, some interests are found to outweigh other
interests.37 In the other form, each interest survives and is given
some relative weight. 38 Even though some values are ultimately
dominated by others in the first form, neither form denies values
entirely.39
Still, balancing suffers from its instinct for setting important
values against each other.40 Although all interests should be
represented when balancing is done correctly, the mental process
of balancing ultimately leads to some sense of the relative
importance of the competing interests. This attitude conflicts
with the neutrality goal of procedural design. 41 Procedural
35. See id. at 945.
36. See id. at 946.
37. See id. ("Under this view, the Court places the interests on a set of scales
and rules the way the scales tip.").
38. See id. ("The image [under the second view] is one of balanced scales with
constitutional doctrine calibrated according to the relative weights of the interests.").
39. See id. at 945-46 (explaining that every interest implicated in a balancing
approach is recognized, notwithstanding that in the first form one interest may
outweigh other interests, and in the second form each interest is measured against
all the other interests).
40. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 59 (1992) ("Balancing weighs competing rights or interests.").
41. Administrative law mantra decrees that unconstrained judicial imposition
of procedure does significant harm. Compare Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546, 548 (1978) (declaring
that unless a regulatory agency fails to follow its statutory procedural guidelines,
courts should not examine the perceived procedural defects because such intrusion
would undermine the policy prescribed by Congress), with Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633,
645-46 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (directing that, when reviewing an agency decision, the
reviewing court must look at the record to determine if "the decision was based 'on a
consideration of the relevant factors'"), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Here,
it is sufficient to suggest that thoughtful judicial concern for procedure, perhaps
guided by some of the observations below, can be expected to make a positive
contribution to the law. This is true because, unlike many substantive areas, judges
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designers are led to net the individual's interest against the
community's.42 Instead, they should recognize the commonality of
community interests and those of its members. Procedural design
should then coordinate those interests.
The leading alternative to balancing has been
"categorization."43 Categorization is an ordering whereby a large
number of actual events are brought within a manageable
system.44 In application, an individual case is decided by
classifying it according to these categories and applying the
preset legal rules. 45 This approach leads a court to reason from
differences of kind rather than degree. 46 In judicial reasoning
throughout our history, categorization has been an important,
and often dominant, strategy.47 Balancing was not prevalent in
Supreme Court opinions until the second quarter of the twentieth
century. 48 Before balancing became dominant, the Court resolved
clashes of interest in a categorical fashion. 49 Today, however,
categorization is seen as doctrinaire and stifling; hence,
balancing has come to dominate modern legal decisionmaking
theory, if not often actual practice.50
have substantial understanding of procedural design subtleties.
42. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 61 ("Balancing requires the explicit
articulation and comparison of rights or structural provisions, modes of
infringement, and government interests.").
43. See id. at 60 (arguing that strict scrutiny review for fundamental liberties
and rational review for socioeconomic legislation are examples of categorical
approaches).
44. See Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs.
L. & Soc. 3 (1980). Kennedy's "classical legal thought" seems the equivalent of what
is termed here "categorization": "Classical legal thought was an ordering, in the
sense that it took a very large number of actual processes and events and asserted
that they could be reduced to a much smaller number with a definite pattern." Id. at
8.
45. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 59 (noting that a categorical approach is
"rule-like" in that it identifies classes into which factual scenarios fall).
46. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 949 ("The power to tax was the power
to destroy; states could exercise police power but could not regulate commerce;
legislatures could impair contractual remedies but not obligations.").
47. See id. ("The great constitutional opinions of the nineteenth century and
early twentieth century did not employ balancing as a method of constitutional
argument or justification.").
48. See id. (noting that Justices Marshall, Story, and Taney resolved cases with
a categorical, rather than a balancing, approach).
49. See id. "Classical legal thought" of this long period engaged in "an objective
task of drawing lines or categorizing actions." Kennedy, supra note 44, at 12.
Although this decisional strategy of categorization may also be identified as
"formalism," see id. at 5, categorization is not necessarily grounded in formalistic
analysis.
50. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 965-66 (arguing that because of its
flexibility, balancing has become the "central metaphor for procedural due process
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Although the modern legal mind seems most comfortable
with justifications based on balancing, judges are as apt to rely
on categorization.51 As Sheppard observed: "The Court balances,
and the Court categorizes. Not only are both methods compatible,
but both are now sufficiently entrenched as judicial tools of
adjudication that the Court is unlikely to rewrite so much
precedent merely because of a mode of interpretation.',s2
A recent example is County of Sacramento v. Lewis.53 The
parents of a motorcycle passenger killed in a high speed chase
with the police brought a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of
the passenger's substantive due process right to life.54 The Court
referred to a half century of cases identifying government
conduct that "shocks the conscience.',s5 From these cases, it
discerned "that the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause is violated by executive action only when it 'can properly
be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a
constitutional sense.',s6 Explaining this test's application, the
Court stated that "the constitutional concept of conscience
shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault,
but rather points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it,
only at the ends of the tort law's spectrum of culpability.,s7 The
Court therefore went on to describe the content of the "conscience
shocking" category and its foundation on governmental needs.58
The Court then held: "Regardless whether [the sheriffs deputy's]
behavior offended the reasonableness held up by tort law or the
balance struck in law enforcement's own codes of sound practice,
it does not shock the conscience, and petitioners are not called
upon to answer for it under§ 1983."59
More to the point, procedural due process analysis involves
categorization in the first instance before it makes a move to
Mathews balancing. The "new" due process analysis, recognizing
analysis").
51. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 40, at 69 (observing that the Supreme Court
Justices divided over the choice between "rules"-a categorization-based approachand "standards"-a balancing-based approach-in the 1991 term).
52. Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional
Balance Between the Citizen and the Perfectionist State, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 969, 975
(1994).
53. 523 u.s. 833 (1998).
54. See id. at 837.
55. See id. at 846-47.
56. Id. at 847 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)).
57. Id. at 848.
58. See id. at 849 (noting that unjustifiable, injurious conduct by a
governmental actor is the epitome of"conscience-shocking" behavior).
59. Id. at 855.
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"new property'' and "new liberty'' interests, utilizes categorizations
whereby the existence of a procedural due process right is
determined by whether the interest involved is one protected by
the due process clauses. These interests are protected because
they are classified with those the Constitution designates for
protection, not because a judicial balance has been struck in their
favor. Goldberg did not change the well-established reliance on
categorization. Indeed, Goldberg itself is based on categorization:
trial-like procedures were required because the "entitlement" met
the definition of "property.'.so Interests within these categories
have been defined by the Constitution as sufficiently weighty to
justify procedural protection without balancing them against some
other value in the individual case.61
Still, Mathews has committed procedural design to
balancing. 62 Balancing is seen as a strategy for the objective or
scientific development of the law. 63 Yet practical difficulties in
developing a principled measure of the relative worth of important
values often overwhelm balancing efforts.64 Therefore,
implementing a balancing strategy requires a scale of values
external to judges, but such fundamental information is not
available. A scientific or objective view of balancing surpasses
reality.
Actually, both the justification and criticism of the balancing
strategy stem from its emotional, rather than scientific, appeal.
60. See 3 KOCH, supra note 1, at 69. The debate over the definition of liberty
interest in Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) provides an example. Each of the
Justices adopted categorization. See id. at 486 (holding that prison discipline via
solitary confinement did not "present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in
which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest"); id. at 488 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that solitary confinement was such "a severe alteration in the
conditions of D incarceration" that due process was violated); id. at 493 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (finding that prison discipline that produces a severe change in
circumstances must comply with due process). Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the
Court, distinguished the "intricate balancing . . . in determining the amount of
process due" from the definition of liberty interest itself. See id. at 478. The majority
held that the prison disciplinary decision at issue fell outside the definition of liberty
interest because the decision "did not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. at 48687. Justice Ginsburg, however, would have looked to the Due Process Clause itself
for a definition. See id. at 489 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also relied
on a liberty-defining analysis. See id. at 493-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (propounding
that solitary confinement deprives an inmate of liberty).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
62. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 994 (noting that Mathews is the foundation
for modern due process analysis).
63. See id. at 960-62 (noting the parallel development of social sciences and
balancing approaches).
64. See id. at 973 (observing that one problem with a balancing approach is the
absence of an analytic method for weighing competing interests).
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On one hand, balancing presents some methodological
opportunities that have suggested its utility to the modem legal
mind. Balancing offers an opportunity for a judge to tailor the
law for a particular litigation;65 it seems less abstract and more
sensitive to individual circumstances. 66 On the other hand,
balancing has been criticized as allowing judicial law-making
based on personal prejudice and preference.67 A corrupt resort to
the balancing strategy can be a tool for deceit and special interest
promotion just as an honest employment of the strategy can
illuminate sensitive comparisons of accepted values.68 While
ideally, the freedom won through balancing assists the
decisionmaker in achieving individual justice, this freedom also
carries the opportunity for abuse. 69
Balancing's adaptability to judicial policymaking is another
aspect that fits the modem instinct for judicial activism.70
Balancing permits judges to justify policymaking on the
circumstances of the individual case before them. For broad
policymaking, however, the very focus on the individual case
recommends against balancing. Through balancing, judicial
policymaking may be opportunistic in disregarding and
modifying past approaches, but judges are also limited in their
policy choices by the context of the case presented. In short,
balancing fails policymaking because of its tendency to narrow
perspective and its weakness in incorporating past learning.
In contrast to balancing, categorization is seen as insensitive
to changing circumstances and as a restraint on judicial
activism. 71 Yet categorization can be extremely creative. It does
affect, or one might say discipline, the mental process by which
65. See id. at 961 (arguing that balancing approaches mimic common law
approaches, thereby permitting flexibility and providing for gradual change in the
law).
66. See id. (explaining that balancing approaches usually involve an in-depth
analysis of the particular factual situation facing the court).
67. See id. (arguing that balancing approaches are susceptible to "unprincipled
adjudication"); Sullivan, supra note 40, at 62 (noting that categorization reduces the
potential of the decisionmaker to "factor[] the parties' particular attractive or
unattractive qualities into the decisionmaking calculus").
68. See Sheppard, supra note 52, at 970 (asserting that a balancing method can
be employed for honest or dishonest purposes, depending on the intent of the person
employing the method).
69. Refer to note 68 supra and accompanying text.
70. Refer to notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text (discussing balancing's
flexibility). See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 66 (noting that balancing methods permit
treating cases that are substantively alike similarly).
71. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 66 (proposing that rules are non-adaptive
and thus sometimes become obsolete, whereas the flexible nature of standards
permits adaptation to changing circumstances).
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one evaluates or evolves ideas and this mental discipline has a
natural tendency towards ordering. Still, this ordering generates
its own creativity. 72 Accordingly, this form of bounded creativity
is a valuable strategy for procedural design.
Categorization is dynamic as well as creative. It is quite
useful for adapting to new circumstances and new social
problems. Duncan Kennedy described the reciprocal nature of its
developmental strategy whereby practice influences the system
of premises and the system of premises influences practice. 73 As
to categorization's operational strategy, he observed: "The basic
mode of this influence of theory on results is that the ordering of
myriad practices into a systematization occurs through
simplifying and generalizing categories, abstractions that become
the tools available when the practitioner Gudge or advocate)
approaches a new problem."74 Categorization is a decisional tool
that can incorporate all relevant values in the face of new
circumstances without, as in balancing, setting the values
against each other. The dynamic and adaptive, yet necessarily
applied, aspects of categorization can serve procedural design.
For this purpose, categorization must be distinguished from
a strategy based on rules. Some see categorization as "rule-like"
in that "[i]t defines bright-line boundaries and then classifies fact
situations as falling on one side or the other."75 Rules are indeed
applied in this fashion, but categorization decisions, as easily as
balancing ones, "explicitly considerD all relevant factors with an
eye to the underlying purposes or background principles or
policies at stake."76 Categorization may, often better than
balancing, "collapse decisionmaking back into the direct
application of the background principle. or policy to a fact
situation."77 Thus, categorization can result in what some would
call a "standard"-directed decisionmaking, 78 but it is still a
process that does not foreclose judicial discretion in making
adjustments to fit individual cases.
72.
See, e.g., STEVEN JAY GoULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND
THE NATURE OF HISTORY 98 (1989) (referring to taxonomy-the science of

classification-as a "fundamental and dynamic science").
73. . See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 8 ("[Classical legal thought] is designed to
tell us about the theoretical atmosphere within which practices occurred, and to tell
us about the manner in which the theoretical atmosphere influenced particular
results.").
74. ld. (emphasis added).
75. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 59.
76. ld. at 60.
77.
Id. at 58.
78. See id. at 61-62 (opining that a rule is "simply the crystalline precipitate of
prior fluid balancing that has repeatedly come out the same way").
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Nor should categorization, at least the categorization
referenced here, be confused with "formalism." Categorization
may be seen as a kind of applied formalism. 79 But unlike an
extreme formalism that ultimately generates strict rules, this
categorization disciplines, but does not inhibit, development.
Indeed, this categorization, by demanding a continuing
reworking of classification with each new "sample" dispute
resolution, compels change and adaptation of general principles
as well as adjustments related to the specific case. Categorization
recognizes that theory without application is empty and that
application without order creates systemic chaos.80 Experience
and theory are necessary partners in any progressive evolution of
both practice and ideas.81 This categorization is not slowly
withdrawn from reality as the rules become more wooden with
use, as might be seen in formalism. 82 Rather, categorization
orders a creative and dynamic decisionmaking process.
Categorization broadens the perspective of the procedural
design. In balancing, courts focus on the parties' rights and
ignore or undervalue the interests of nonparties.83 Balancing
leads a court to evaluate the various interests of rights holders
without focusing attention on a complete set of interests.84 In
conducting balancing, courts do not list all the interests
potentially affected. To the point, for example, Aleinikoff
observed that the Court in Goldberg made no effort to inventory
the wide range of interests involved, nor did the Court disclose
the basis on which it restricted its balance.85 As a generalization,
Aleinikoff offered: "Taking balancing seriously would seem to
demand the kind of investigation of the world that courts are
unable or unwilling to undertake."86 Similarly, courts fail to
79. "'Formalism' describes legal theories that stress the importance of
rationally uncontroversial reasoning in legal decision, whether from highly
particular rules or quite abstract principles." Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy,
45 U. PITr. 1. REV. 1, 9 (1983).
80. See, e.g., GoULD, supra note 72, at 27-45 (discussing how early forms of
biological categories or taxonomies were often based on a theory, such as creationism
or the systematic increase in the diversity of life forms, but overlooked or
contradicted actual data collected from the fossil record).
81. See id. at 98-100.
82. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1001 ("A nonbalancing approach ... does
not require a court to be blind to the consequences of constitutional rules or the
social context in which constitutional questions arise.").
83. See id. at 978 ("In many balancing cases, ... courts make no serious effort
to place the interests of non-parties on the scale.").
84. See, e.g., id. at 977 (observing that the Court does not give weight to all
possible relevant interests when performing its balancing approach).
85. See id. at 977-78.
86. Id. at 978.
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justify in any objective sense the weight given to relevant
interests or even to disclose the sources used in deriving those
weights.87 Thus, the law created by balancing does not adequately
develop transferable principles.
Here, categorization has a clear advantage. It naturally
searches for commonality. By ordering interests, it can provide
solutions to similar problems. Through experience, categorical
solutions are fine-tuned. Unlike balancing, then, categorization is
progressive in that it is a continuous process of incorporating
new learning and experience. Some of that learning might result
from balancing, but it is still better captured as general
principles by categorization.
Furthermore, some observers doubt that values are
sufficiently commensurate to validate balancing in many cases.88
It may be deceptive to attempt to denominate rights in a single
currency and weigh their relative worth. 89 The often subconscious
realization that the interests involved are not actually
comparable leads courts to camouflage the "intuitive" nature of
their decisions with balancing justifications.90 Although
procedural rights may involve a more manageable set of values,
the commensurability of all those values remains in doubt. 91 Even
if Schauer is correct that rights decisions based on imperfect
commensurability may still be preferable, the impediments to

87. See id. at 976 (noting that, in its opinions, the Court sometimes fails to
enumerate the analytical weights used to arrive at its conclusion).
88. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. REV. 779, 796, 798 (1994) (arguing that incommensurability, which is an
important part of law and society, occurs when "relevant goods cannot be aligned
along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how
those goods are best characterized") (emphasis omitted). The incommensurability
debate is informative but generally beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Mathew
Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169-70
(1998) (defining incommensurability as the lack of a means of comparison among
options or choices).
89. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 973 ("The problem for constitutional
balancing is the derivation of the scale needed to translate the value of interests into
a common currency for comparison.").
90. See id. at 975-76 (arguing that when courts attempt "to strike the
unstrikeable balance," they resort to techniques such as using a vocabulary that
creates the appearance of comparison, depreciating of one of the interests, and
stating the problem in balancing terms, but actually deciding the case otherwise).
91. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 896-97
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that the burden on
interstate commerce of submitting to state court jurisdiction was not commensurate
with the value of the local interests in reaching a defendant corporation that was
beyond the personal jurisdiction of the state court). Justice Scalia urged that where
rights are not commensurate, decisions should be left to the political authorities. See
id. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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comparison devalue the balancing enterprise in procedural
design as in many others. 92
Balancing conflates the procedural and substantive
questions to the disadvantage of both. By pitting interests
against each other, balancing tends to convert substantive
questions into procedural answers. 93 Goldberg was obviously
really about cutting off welfare benefits; the more elaborate the
procedures, the fewer denials or reconsiderations will be made.94
The real motivation can be clearly seen under the procedural
surface of Justice Brennan's opinion. 95 Indeed, Justice Black's
dissent challenges Justice Brennan's opinion, in that Justice
Black believes that more procedures will ultimately mean fewer
benefits. 96 If the debate is about the most effective procedures in
a given context, then balancing tends to misdirect the inquiry. In
addition, if the debate revolves around the resolution of certain
substantive social policy issues, then balancing interests to
answer procedural questions is, at best, artificial. Categorization
necessarily involves classification and, hence, better focuses
procedural design tasks.
The substantive policy implication of the choice of balancing
over categorization is ambiguous. Many assert that
categorization is biased towards social policy conservatism,97
whereas balancing unleashes the courts to further liberal social
92. See Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional
Consequences, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 785, 806 (1994) (arguing that decisionmaking that
holds rights commensurable to the greatest extent possible may still be valuable).
Schauer propounds a kind of second-best argument whereby shutting down the
analysis in the absence of perfect commensurability is inferior to founding a decision
on even imperfect commensurability. See id. at 799.
93. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 1313-15 (discussing the courts' difficulty in
defining the parameters of "some kind of hearing," which an administrative agency
must provide parties in order to satisfy due process); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Block, 755
F.2d 368, 370 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[W]e cannot tamper with the administrative process
simply because we do not like what is being done.").
94. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (declaring that pretermination proceedings are essential to ensure that welfare recipients 'vill continue
to receive their benefits).
95. See id. at 267 (noting that welfare benefit recipients are protected from
"erroneous termination of . . . benefits" if a hearing occurs before the benefits are
terminated). Cf. Ewingv. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950)
(deferring to Congress's decision that no hearing was required in an "administrative
determination to make multiple seizures" of"misbranded articles").
96. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting) (predicting that the
government will be forced to perform a thorough review of a welfare claimant's
eligibility, and thereby delay or prevent some claimants from obtaining welfare
benefits).
97. See Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319, 32022 (1992) (opining that the categorical approach tends to produce conservative
adjudication).
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policies.98 While balancing facilitates change, it does not direct
such change in any particular policy direction. 99 Categorization is
conservative in the sense that once a category has been
established, the status quo is protected because the revision of a
category, given its generalized application, requires careful
justification. 100 Nonetheless, the established order may as easily
be liberal social policy as not. 101 Balancing may precipitate
change but, as we see today, this decisionmaking freedom may
move in any public policy direction. 102 Hence, in the procedural
design context, a court so disposed can easily weigh the balance
to further either "conservative" or ''liberal" social policy goals.103
In sum, procedural design must break free from balancing
analysis and seek to coordinate the various interests through
the evolution of workable categories. These categories will
permit continual development and ready communication of
98. See id. at 321 ("(A] rich consideration of all the relevant factors [through
balancing] will naturally tend to lead to the expansion of individual rights because
such an expansion is simply the moral thing to do.").
99. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 960 (arguing that although "balancing
facilitate[s] doctrinal change" by focusing on real world concerns, balancing itself
does not necessarily determine a "liberal or conservative agenda").
100. See generally GoULD, supra note 72, at 98 (explaining that the science of
taxonomy provides more than simple descriptions of categories; classification
systems include the rationale or principle underlying the category structure). Any
subsequent change to a category must therefore satisfy the requirements of that
underlying rationale or principle.
101. In the procedural design context, social policy choices are particularly
confusing. Social policy liberals would be expected to support processes that enable
government, and social policy conservatives would be expected to support processes
that inhibit government. Yet the procedural choices of social policy liberals and
conservatives have furthered substantive interests exactly the opposite of what
might be expected. Social policy liberals have been strong advocates of a formalism
that handicaps active government whereas social policy conservatives seem
protective of active government. Liberal procedural choices, for example, Justice
Brennan's view in Goldberg, see Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (declaring that a pretermination hearing is required before welfare benefits are cut oft), inhibits social
programs, as pointed out by Justice Black, see id. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting)
(predicting that the requirement of a pre-determination hearing before welfare
benefits are cut off will result in fewer people obtaining welfare benefits), and
conservative procedural choices, for example, Justice Scalia's view in Sandin, see
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (holding that a state may prescribe
solitary confinement without violating due process so long as the state does not
create an atypical or significant deprivation of liberty), promote active government.
102. Refer to note 60 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1227
(6th Cir. 1997) ("In our view, Defendants' interest in promoting the efficiency of the
public service that the Board performs outweighs Plaintiffs' interests in petitioning
for unemployment benefits."); Lange-Kessler v. Department of Educ., 109 F.3d 137,
142 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that a statute regulating midwives was "rationally
related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting the health and welfare of
mothers and infants").
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learning about both specific and general procedural choices.
Further, this strategy will neither mandate wooden decisions
nor a particular social policy commitment. Rather, it will
support a more broadly sensitive and progressive approach to
procedural design.

C. A New Attitude for Procedural Design
The attitude generated by categorization best serves to
evolve a coordinated procedural design system. A categorizationtype strategy has the advantage, consistent with the theme of
this article, of supporting a system of principles that values the
various interests involved in procedural design without trading
them off against each other. While denying balancing's
dominance, the system of principles sought here does not reject
it. Procedural design must seek the advantages of alternative
strategies, and the task is to find coherence in these alternative
strategies. The search is for a system of principles, derived from
the fertile caselaw and commentary, uninhibited by a
commitment to balancing.
Procedural design has been and was intended to be a
dynamic process,104 continually evolving in accordance with new
experience and empirical data. 105 The principles driving
procedural design must remain flexible and eclectic.106 Moreover,
the derivation of this system of principles must adopt Fuller's
insight that "goals and means interact."107 Establishing principles
is a dynamic process in which the principles are developing along
with the innovations in procedures. Of course, while these
principles cannot be asked to do too much, that they are not
absolute does not mean they lack force. 108 When the range of
application is so broad and the alternatives are so global, the
104. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("'[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.").
105. See id. at 162-63.
106. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so
often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.").
107. Robert S. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's
Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 433, 438 (1978).
108. Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An
Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 903
(1979) ("[A]bsolute in force is not the same as unlimited in range or scope. A
principle or a right can be absolute when applied without being applicable to every
situation.").
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system of principles provides the pillars. Upon these pillars can
be built the necessary body oflaw.
This system of principles can be made to take advantage of
both categorization and balancing. The system creates coherence
by merging these apparently conflicting strategies into a unified
decisional mechanism. 109 This process begins by seeking the
advantages offered by both methods. 110 The drive to coherence
finds force in one outstanding commonality: both systems value
and evaluate interests.m The difference, as Sullivan observed, is
that, "[f]or the categorizer, legal questions turn on differences in
kind; for the balancer, they are matters of degree."112 Procedural
design often needs to approach the question in terms of both kind
and degree, or, at least, consider whether the question is best
approached through analysis based on one or the other.
Balancing contributes as a method of individual decision, and
these individual decisions contribute to the body of experience
that helps to develop procedural-design categories. 113 Therefore,
application of existing categories in particular cases will
continually modify the categories so that they may adjust to new
experience and future procedural requirements.
In fact, balancing often evolves, especially in application,
into categories.114 Categories are in some sense established,
justified, and adjusted through "global balancing."115 "Categoric
balancing'' may, in reality, be seen as either balancing or
categorization; the balance, once struck, is applied as categories.
Indeed, exposition on or derivation of principles may look to
balancing as well as classification.116 Even ad hoc balancing
109.

See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45

HAsTINGS L.J. 825, 838 (1994) ("The dispute over categorization and balancing is

miscast for three reasons. First, the methods are not often determinative. Second,
the methods can often be translated into one another. Third, . . . the dispute is
miscast because the decision between balancing and not balancing is illusory.")
(footnotes omitted).
110. See Sheppard, supra note 52, at 973 ("[T]he discussion about whether the
balancing or the categorical approach is better ... reflects a false dichotomy.").
111. See Gottlieb, supra note 109, at 860 ("As it turns out, interests occupy an
inescapable logical place in both [balancing and rules] systems."); Aleinikoff, supra
note 1, at 1002 ("[T]here is no basis for the notion that non-balancing approaches are
necessarily formalistic or unconcerned with the social context oflegal rules.").
112. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 59.
113. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1000 ("[T]o recognize a role for balancing in
the extreme and rare case is not to demonstrate its validity as a mode of
interpretation for the vast majority of constitutional cases.").
114. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 61 (observing that any differences between
categorizing and balancing are differences of degree).
115. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 978 (stating that "the Court usually appears
to adopt a global balance, examining the interests on some classwide basis").
116. See Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor
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would be too burdensome to decisionmakers without certain
standards or limits on the range of issues for which balancing
actually is to be employed. 117 Sullivan concluded: "These
distinctions between rules and standards, categorization and
balancing, mark a continuum, not a divide."118
Categorization, however, as the foundational framework for
procedural design, shifts the inquiry's nature from an attitude of
adverseness to an attitude of coordination and furthers the
ultimate goal of optimizing all relevant values. It moves forward
seeking a more sophisticated understanding of general
procedural design principles as it guides application.
Categorization also enhances the predictability of the procedural
design system so that individuals and litigants will be informed
as to the combination of procedural elements expected in a given
set of circumstances. 119 In short, procedural design will work
toward objective guidance for procedural designers in specific
contexts and in continuing to improve general principles.
An attitude adjustment from adverseness to coordination
will recast the due process factors discussed below as points of
sensitivity. Attention to these points of sensitivity will optimize
both community interests and those of the community's
individual members. Thus, we come back to Mathews
jurisprudence. Rather than merely approaching this body of
thinking as balancing, we can see it as a mass of experience and
thinking constantly evolving into a better understanding of
procedural design.

II.

THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE IN THE MATHEWS FACTORS

Mathews tells us that there are three types of
considerations: the efficacy of the procedures, the interest of
those directly affected by the decisions, and the "state's"
interest. 120 As suggested, this opinion has created two balancing
exercises: a cost/benefit analysis of additional or alternative
Schauer, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 813, 819-20 (1994) (arguing that weighing or balancing a
value means "any form of reasoning or argumentation about the values in
question").
117. See Gottlieb, supra note 109, at 855-56 ("The difficulties of balancing or
'optimization' have also led scholars to define forms of 'bounded rationality' in which
various rules of thumb substitute for fully comparative weighing of alternatives.")
(footnote omitted).
118. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 61.
119. See id. at 62 (arguing that rules are fairer than standards because they
prevent courts from arbitrarily factoring a party's particular "attractive or
unattractive qualities" into a decision).
120. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
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procedures and a trade-off between the state's interests and
those of individual citizens. The first flounders on the absence of
sufficient information about the various procedures'
effectiveness, but is nonetheless a useful exercise. The second
distorts, or at least oversimplifies, consideration of the values
served by procedural design. Accordingly, a coherent and
coordinating strategy will better serve procedural design. The
search for coherence rests on the commonality between the
procedural interests of the community and those of its individual
members. Thus, the Mathews factors must be reinterpreted to
maximize both interests simultaneously.
A. The "Government's Interest" Redefined as the Community's
Interest

A closer look at Mathews supports a reading of the factors in
tandem, rather than trading them against each other. Other
foundational opinions such as the 1961 Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers opinion might be reconsidered in the same way. In
Cafeteria, the Court may not have been asserting that the
interests were adverse when it said: (([C]onsideration of what
procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action. "121
As with the Mathews language, it is at least as easy to say that
the Cafeteria Court contemplated consideration of these interests
without trading them against each other. The task, then, is to
demonstrate commonality between the interests of the ''state"
and those of its individual citizens.
"Government interest" is, of course, used frequently in
substantive constitutional law questions and procedural design
should be able to seek guidance from that body of
jurisprudence.122 Government interest analysis, however, is so
underdeveloped, sophomoric, and unsophisticated that there is
no reason to consider transferring that learning to procedural
design. 123 Gottlieb concluded: "[T]he Court's treatment of
governmental interests has become largely intuitive ...."124
121. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961).
122. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 924 ("Regardless of terminology, most
constitutional jurisprudence involves some overt or covert comparison between
individual rights and governmental interests.") (footnote omitted).
123. See id. at 932-35.
124. Id. at 937.
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Procedural designers must then develop their own sense of that
interest.
The first step is to reinterpret the term "government
interest" as representing the interests of the entire community,
and not just the interests of government institutions. The
community exists for the individual. Community interests cannot
be separated from the interests of individual members; nor can
the interests of members be separated from the interests of their
community. On closer consideration, the logic of setting the state
against the individual breaks down. The community establishes
programs to serve its individual members and charges the
government with the responsibility to effect these programs
fairly and effectively.125 When government fails, it fails both the
community and its individual members, usually the former more
than the latter.
In the procedural context discussed here, the two interests,
even if distinguishable, usually move in the same direction. The
community interest is best served by processes that serve
individual community members. Indeed, they gain strength from
each other in most procedural contexts and, hence, the due
process analysis should sum the community interests and those
of its members rather than subtract one from the other.126 In
simplistic quantitative terms, a judge who evaluates the
individual interest as 8 and the community interest as 2 should
find that the procedural question has a value of 10, not 6. The
task, then, is to set the foundation for a procedural design system
that coordinates these interests.
Although the government's function is to carry forward the
best interest of the greater society, its interests are distinct from
the community's interests. 127 Governmental institutions often
have interests bound up in procedural questions, and the
community cares about these institutions because they form a
125. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Justifying Departures from Equal Treatment, 81 J.
OF PHIL. 587, 593 (1984) (stating that an interest envisioned by the rational
individual as a compelling state interest is one the government has a duty to fairly
and effectively achieve).
126. See Gottlieb, supra note 109, at 865 ("Instead of claims of right isolated
from public purposes, the claims of right gain strength from those public purposes.").
127. Jeffrie G. Murphy stated the following:
Using Robert Nozick's metaphor, we might ... consider the matter in this
way: If we think of the state as an agency that we might hire (at a cost in
both money and liberty) to do a certain job for us, how would we write the
job description? ... [A] state interest is to be viewed as compelling if and
only if it is one of the interests or goals that one can properly imagine
rational persons forming a government to achieve.
Murphy, supra note 125, at 593.
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significant part of the machinery furthering the community's
goals. But the two categories of interest are not coextensive. The
instrumental interests of government should serve both
interests. Indeed, if governmental institutions are serving only
their own interests, the governmental system is defective.
Supporting the interests of governmental institutions may
further the community's interest, or that of its members or both
simultaneously, but the governmental interests that are relevant
in the context of these overarching interests do not hold a
premier place in the analysis.
Setting the "state" against its citizens is not the
Constitution's foundational perspective. Indeed, the founding
society had quite a different vision of the relationship between
the community and its members. 128 This vision is captured in the
incorporation of "police power" into constitutional law
jurisprudence. Novak observed:
"Police" in this sense stood for something much grander
than a municipal security force. It referred to the
growing sense that the state had an obligation not
merely to maintain order and administer justice, but to
aggressively foster "the productive energies of society
and provid[e] the appropriate institutional framework for
it."12
In sum, government was envisioned by the founding society as
serving the community and its members.
On the other hand, the Constitution read as a whole requires
a due process analysis compatible with the entire constitutional
structure. Even mindful of the fact that both due process clauses
came after the original text, and hence, might be seen as limits
on existing structure, those clauses still cannot substantially
compromise the overall constitutional scheme. For this reason,
the third Mathews factor could be seen as a constitutional
minimum. A court undertaking due process review must consider
the impact on the other constitutional functions. As a part of the
whole, application of the due process clauses cannot unduly
interfere with legislative and executive processes and
128. See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in
America, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 1061, 1070 (1994) ("[References in early Supreme Court
opinions] suggest ... a vision that distinctly refused to separate public powers and
private rights in favor of an over-arching notion of 'well-ordered' and 'well-regulated'
community, in which liberties and powers, rights and duties were mutually
interwoven.").
129. Id. at 1084 (quoting Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State and the
Development of Modernity in Seventeenth-and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An
Attempt at a Comparative Approach, 80 AM. HIST- REv. 1221, 1226 (1975)).

2000]

DUE PROCESS CALCULUS

661

responsibilities. It would seem to follow that a court that does not
take this interest seriously slips its constitutional leash.
Nonetheless, the sensitivity to governmental operations must, at
base, become a sensitivity to the function of government in
serving the community interest.
The third factor in Mathews expressly refers to the
government's interests, "including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."130 This third
Mathews factor, however, is incomplete if confined to a concem
for the governmental administration. In Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, the Court expressed the
true intent of this consideration as the "nature of the
government function." 131 It is not just the fiscal and
administrative burden, but the totality of the govemment
function assigned by the community that must be served. The
institutional interests of the government, as such, must be
given weight not for themselves, but as they relate to their
underlying mission. 132 The governmental institutions themselves
have interests that may be indirectly related to their societal
function, but in fact exist independent of that function. 133 A
maverick governmental operation may as likely-or more
likely-be adverse to the community's interest as to the
individual members' interests. 134 Procedural design that serves
130. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
131. 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (emphasis added).
132. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) ("Here, as in Love, the
statute involved was enacted in aid of the Commonwealth's police function for the
purpose of protecting the safety of its people."); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114
(1977) ("Far more substantial than the administrative burden [in drivers' license
suspension proceedings], however, is the important public interest in safety on the
roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard.").
133. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991) (criticizing a state's
prejudgment attachment procedure that did not include notice). "[T]he State cannot
seriously plead additional financial or administrative burdens involving
predeprivation hearings when it already claims to provide an immediate post
deprivation hearing." Id. at 16; see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 155
(1992) ("[T]he Bureau [of Prisons] has a substantial interest in encouraging internal
resolution of grievances and in preventing the undermining of its authority by
unnecessary resort by prisoners to the federal courts."). The Court found, however,
that this interest did not outweigh the failure to render medical care. See id. at 149,
155. The process for driver's license suspension for failure to take a breath-analysis
test was upheld because it assisted the state in criminal proceedings. See Mackey,
443 U.S. at 18; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that
there is a greater interest in protecting the individual's right to assistance in
criminal proceedings than in the protection of public funds and, therefore, due
process requires that an individual be given an adequate hearing before any welfare
benefits are terminated). See generally Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
134. See Sheppard, supra note 52, at 987 (observing two overarching limits on
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the institutional interests does not necessarily serve community
interests.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property provides a
good example of a situation in which the government's interest is
not the same as the community's interest. 135 The case involved
the need for pre-seizure process in a drug case. 136 The Court
recognized that the enforcement authorities had an interest in ex
parte seizure,137 but concluded that those interests were not
strong enough in the law enforcement context to justify such
procedures for real property. 138 Clearly, drug law enforcement is
very much in the community's interest. The community is, of
course, also aligned with effective law enforcement. However,
unlike the law enforcement officials, the community loses a good
deal from having property tied up. The community interest, as
well as the individual interest, supports great care in seizing
property. Thus, both interests generally move the inquiry in the
direction of greater attention to procedural integrity.
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court had
difficulty determining the difference between the community's
interest and the "state" or governmental interest. 139 The Court
recognized that care in taking a child from his or her mother
was in the interest of the mother and the community/40 but
found the government's administrative costs and the "State's
pecuniary interest ... hardly significant enough to overcome"
such important private interests. 141 Yet the Court had not fully
recognized the interests other than those of the individuals
and the government. 142 If it had, the "calculus" would have

assertions of governmental interest: ''The interest may not impermissibly infringe on
protected individual rights, and the interest asserted by one organ of government
may not exceed the scope of that organ's authority.").
135. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53-56
(1993) (deciding that the individual's interest-his right to maintain control over his
home and to be free from governmental interference-is at odds with the
government's right to seizure of the individual's goods).
136. See id. at 46-47.
137. See id. at 52.
138. See id. at 57 (holding that personal property, unlike real property, could be
removed to avoid seizure, and that prior seizure was unnecessary to preserve the
court's jurisdiction over real property).
139. 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) ("Applying the Due Process Clause is ... an
uncertain enterprise which must discover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in
a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by
assessing the several interests that are at stake.").
140. See id. at 27.
141. See id. at 28.
142. See id. at 31 (balancing only the individual's and the parent's interests
against those of the "State").
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been much more complicated. Although the community has a
strong interest in caring for children, it has a similar interest
in protecting the family. Again, in a sense, although both the
individual's and the community's interests were adverse to the
administrative interest, the community interest also supported
effective administration. Moreover, the community interest
was aligned with both the child's individual interest and that
of the mother. In short, a simplistic balance of the state's
interests against the interests of selected individuals hardly
captures the case's intricacies.
A major source of confusion is the fact that the governmental
institutions are left to assert and implement the community's
interests. In the wider sense, procedural design cannot be
insensitive to the operation of government. Indeed, concern for
governmental operation may be a constitutional imperative. This
concern, however, is relevant to procedural design only to assure
that government properly serves the community interest
entrusted to the government and not as it serves the government
institution as such.
B. Coordinating Community Interest and Individual Interest

The enterprise of building a procedural design system
demands that what has been expressed as the "government's
interest" encompasses the full extent of the interests of society.
Hence, there has been a shift to the term "community interest."143
From this step, the analysis moves to a rejection of the
perception that individual interests and societal or community
interests can best be treated as adverse. 144 This step rejects the
instinct to set the community against the individual as required
by the balancing strategy currently used in the application of
Mathews. 145 These interests, as they affect the resolution of
procedural questions, are interrelated. To set them against each
other is artificial and ultimately endangers the full realization of
both.
The Court often understands the commonality of
community and individual interests in the procedural context.
Zinermon v. Burch provides one prominent example of

143. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 981 ("The individual interest in
communicating one's ideas to others may also be stated as a societal interest in a
diverse marketplace of ideas.").
144. See id. ("Balancing opinions typically pit individual against governmental
interests.").
145. See id. at 982-83.
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procedural evaluation promoting both categories of interests. 146
Burch was taken to a private mental hospital after he "was
found wandering along a Florida highway, appearing to be hurt
and disoriented."147 The Court analyzed the problem without
Mathews balancing. Instead, the Court looked to Burch's
interests and the community's effort to help. 148 The community
wanted to help citizens in conditions such as Burch's, and Burch
himself truly needed help. Both had an overarching interest in
protecting Burch's rights and assuring that Burch was correctly
treated. 149 Indeed, ultimately, the Court needed to do no more
than cause resort to procedures already available. 150 Although
balancing seems strange in the context of this case, Justice
O'Connor criticized the Court for undermining the Mathews
analysis. 151 At base, the individual's interests and the
community's interests were not adverse. Balancing of these
nonadverse interests simply could not advance the analysis of
whether the process used carried forward either's interest.
146. 494 U.S. 113, 137 (1990) (suggesting it is necessary to consider the state
and individual interests as common interests; the state and individual's interest
here were not at odds with one another in that both wanted to limit the power to
admit patients).
147. Id. at 118.
148. See id. To some extent, the Court arrived at this analytical method via a
rather abstract discussion of the application of the Parratt line of cases, see id. at
128-29, in which the Court held that negligent or unauthorized acts cannot be
subjected to the hearing requirements. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328
(1986) (finding that the Due Process Clause is not implicated by a state official's
negligence, which causes harm to or destruction of life, liberty or property); Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that the rule in Parratt regarding an
employee's negligent deprivation of property also applies to intentional deprivation
of property); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (concluding that the
individual's loss could have been compensated by following state procedure and,
therefore, the established state procedures did look to the individual's and the
community's interests).
149. See Burch, 494 U.S. at 122-23, 125.
150. See id. at 137-38.
151. See id. at 144, 147-48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Each of the Court's
distinctions abandons an essential element of the Parratt and Hudson doctrines, and
together they disavow those cases' central insights and holdings."). Yet Justice
Powell distinguished Parratt:
Thus, Parratt is not an exception to the Mathews balancing test, but
rather an application of that test to the unusual case in which one of the
variables in the Mathews equation-the value of predeprivation
safeguards-is negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue.
Therefore, no matter how significant the private interest at stake and the
risk of its erroneous deprivation, the State cannot be required
constitutionally to do the impossible by providing predeprivation process.
Id. at 129 (citation omitted). Implicitly, at least, the Court differentiated the case
before it in Mathews terms because it found that additional procedures were neither
impossible nor valueless, see id. at 137-38, and that the individual and community
interests were extremely compelling. See id. at 131.

2000]

DUE PROCESS CALCULUS

665

In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the
Court again coordinated, rather than traded off, these two
interest categories in upholding the clear and convincing
evidence test. 152 In Cruzan, the Missouri Supreme Court had
ruled that life support could not be terminated without either a
living will or clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
wishes. 153 The stricter evidentiary standard was justified, the
Court said, because of the decision's importance for both the
individual and the community. 154 "We think it self-evident that
the interests at stake in the instant proceedings are more
substantial, both on an individual and societal level, than those
involved in a run-of-the-mine civil dispute."155 Thus, the
community's interests and those of its individual members
supported· each other and increased the significance of the
procedural design.
Procedural designers cannot proceed legitimately without
careful attention to the interests of the whole community. In a
developed society, the community cannot be said to gain other
than through its individual members, and its individual
members cannot be said to gain other than through the
community. Nothing demonstrates this fact more clearly than the
context in which most of the procedural due process cases ariseadministration of programs the community establishes to benefit
the very group of individuals served by the procedural design. In
this context, a procedural design cannot logically favor the
community at the expense of these individuals; such an assertion
is a non sequitur.
There are, of course, conflicts among interests. For example,
some individuals within the community are no doubt adverse to
each other. The community interest equals the sum of the
individual interests and thus, optimizing the community interest,
necessarily involves the trade-off among the interests of
individual community members. Distributions within the
community raise society's most difficult and controversial
questions. How process resources are distributed is a derivative
of these questions. The community's procedures determine how it
will mediate the conflicts among its members, but it is not truly
152. 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990). The Court in FDIC v. Mallen found that both
the community and the individual had an interest in assuring that the government
does not act in haste. See FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 243 (1988).
153. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
154. See id. at 277-78, 280-81 (holding that an issue of "such magnitude and
importance" justifies Missouri's requirement of showing clear and convincing
evidence).
155. Id. at 283.
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adverse to any of those members. The community, however,
seeks resolutions that are best for it, and individuals seek
resolutions that are best for them. From the community's
perspective, the trade-off's among individuals are a zero sum
game in which the community seeks the optimal solution among
all its members.
Indeed, due process controversies are often explicitly
between dueling individual interests. 166 One straightforward
example of this reality can be found in Brock v. Roadway
Express, Inc. 157 The Secretary of Labor's procedures under Section
405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,
forbidding retaliatory discharge of employees, were challenged by
a trucking company as violating procedural due process. 158 The
Company alleged that the employee had intentionally damaged a
truck, but the employee contended that he was discharged in
retaliation for having previously complained about safety
violations. 159 The Court recognized the community's interest in
"promoting highway safety and protecting employees from
retaliatory discharge."160 Both of these interests compel the
correct decision and do not necessarily place the community on
the side of the employer or the employee. The Court considered
the private interests in tandem: "[T]he employee's substantial
interest in retaining his job must be considered along with the
employer's interest in determining the constitutional adequacy of
the § 405 procedures."161 Like the community's interest, the
156. Properly characterized in this regard, due process controversies are often
between competing individual interests in which the government's interest is in
resolving the dispute. For example, in Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991), the
Court applied the Mathews test in evaluating whether Connecticut's prejudgment
attachment procedure complied with due process. The Court substituted the
plaintiffs interest for the government's interest in the traditional Mathews test, but
separated that consideration from "any ancillary interest the government may have
in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater
protections." Id. at 11. The Court ultimately decided that the plaintiffs interests
were minimal and that the government's interest did not affect the balance in favor
of property owners. See id. at 16 ("Here the plaintiffs interest is de minimis.
Moreover, the State cannot seriously plead additional financial or administrative
burdens involving predeprivation hearings when it already claims to provide an
immediate post deprivation hearing."). But cf. Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303,
1310 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the facts did not support a conclusion that a
mother had abused her child). In such a case, it is important to note that a court's so
finding does not mean that a parent's rights are superior to the child's protection. As
the Whisman court explained, "This does not appear to be a case of balancing the
parent's liberty interest against the state's interest in protecting the child." Id.
157. 481 u.s. 252 (1987).
158. See id. at 255.
159. See id. at 255-56.
160. Id. at 262.
161. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
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individual's interests involved safety, employee rights, and
adequate procedures. The community interest was on both sides,
and the community had an interest in the optimum resolution of
the conflict.
Focus on the community's interest avoids questions
concerning which individual rights should be counted. 162 For
example, in Heller v. Doe, the patients challenged the procedures
that allowed family and guardians to intervene in involuntary
commitment proceedings.163 Ironically, the patients wanted the
system to rely on the state's own experts. 164 The Court found that
accurate commitment decisions were in the individual's interest
as well as the state's.165 Assuming that more information is better
than less, the Court found that intervention by family and
guardians, though necessarily biased in favor of commitment,
increased accuracy. 166 That is, the Court concluded that the
community's interest in reaching the correct commitment
decision incorporated, in the long run, the patient's and family's
interests. This approach at least avoids a determination that
either the patient's or the family's interest is more important.
The community interest is thus an expression of the individual's
interest.
Still, the community and its individual members do come in
conflict at various points. In a procedural design context, even
these conflicts do not move the inquiry in different directions, but
rather affect the final "weight" of the procedural imperative. The
weighing of the individual interests and community interests still
creates a combined value rather than shifting the procedural
design toward one or the other. In this regard, while the two are
not in direct conflict, their different values force an adjustment in
the procedural design commensurate with the sensitivity to the
combined weight of the two interests. That is, the general
community interests may differ from those of a particular
individual member, but the conflict translates, in the procedural
context, into more concern for a procedural design coordiD.ated to
serve those two major categories of interest.

162. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 978 ("Even if a balancer has properly
identified the relevant interests and has an objective scale for their valuation, there
is still the problem of which holders of the relevant interests should be counted.").
163. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 315 (1993).
164. See id. at 330 (noting the patients' concern that allowing "guardians and
immediate family members" to participate in the commitment decision would
"'skewO the balance' against the retarded individual").
165. See id. at 332-33.
166. See id.
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In coordinating the individual interest with the community
interest, it must be understood that the individual's interests
change in kind when the perspective changes from ex ante to ex
post. Once an individual has made a special claim on the
community, his or her interests and those of the community may
be seen as adverse. Ex post, the community's interest may
appear to conflict with those of a particular member; 167 whereas
ex ante the community's interest had been the same as the
individual's. 168 For example, when a potential grant applicant is
interested in the efficient operation of the grant-giving process, a
conflict is created only after the applicant has failed to qualify
through that process. Indeed, it is often true that the particular
individual's interest is intertwined with the particular
community interest with which the individual is in conflict. An
individual driver, for example, is more interested as a driver in
preventing a DUI than is the community in general. Or, although
the community has only a generalized desire to promote the arts,
a potential grant recipient has a specific interest in the
community's commitment to the arts. Although, ex ante, the
particular individual's interest accords with the community's, the
individual's interest in the program converts to adverseness ex
post. Nonetheless, the community's interest continues to
represent its individual members in both categories.
Even before the happening of the event supporting the
individual's claim on the community, these specific adverse
relationships cancel each other out through community
dynamics. 169 The individual community member is in a
167. For example, pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act significantly
affects the liberty interest of arrestees, but "this right may, in circumstances where
the government's interest [in preventing crime by arrestees] is sufficiently weighty,
be subordinated to the greater needs of society." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 750-51 (1987).
168. In a law enforcement context, for example, the calculation involves other
individuals. Expedited action against a bank officer was seen as "necessary to
protect the interests of depositors and to maintain public confidence in our banking
institutions." FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 (1988). See also Barry v. Barchi, 443
U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (preserving the integrity of the sport of horse racing). The
highway safety value recognized in Dixon v. Love accrues to all drivers, including the
suspended. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1977) (holding that the Illinois
statute was designed to protect all drivers by keeping drivers off the roads "who are
unable or un\villing to respect traffic rules and the safety of others"). Indeed, like the
depositors in Mallen, the drivers in Love are the major focus of the protection
afforded; the remainder of society has only an indirect interest.
169. Lawrence C. Becker, for example, observed:
In general, discussing disability issues in terms of equality is not
helpful in this regard-whether it is equality of access, opportunity, life
prospects, or capacities that we have in mind. Proposals to make people
equal in some respect invite us to think in terms of conflict.
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continuous "play'' situation. Game theory provides the best
objective demonstration of the value of cooperation in this
situation.170 It has demonstrated a natural instinct for
cooperation. 171 Indeed, this instinct for cooperation is the
motivation behind community development in the first place; it is
simply in the individual's interest generally to join a community,
even if at the expense of some apparent individual
prerogatives.172 Thus, in the larger sense, even the individual's ex
post interests and the community's interests tend to dovetail as
these interests are perceived in the larger context.
In Goldberg, Justice Brennan himself suggested an example.
He offered the circumstances of a Mrs. Guzman as showing the
value of formalized procedures in the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) process. 173 Were Mrs. Guzman to
leave the AFDC program, however, which is highly probable, and

Thinking about reciprocity, however, is helpful here. An effective norm
of reciprocity resolves problems of pure conflict by seeing to it that people
who are burdened by one aspect of a social relationship, policy, or
transaction are benefited in return by another aspect of it. And when
reciprocity is "full" or complete, meaning that the eventual return to the one
who has been burdened is proportional to that person's sacrifice, then there
is no net loss to anyone. . . . These coordination problems are far from
simple ones, but full reciprocity takes many forms other than a direct titfor-tat exchange.
Lawrence C. Becker, Afterword: Disability, Strategic Action, and Reciprocity, in
ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PuBLIC POLICY 293, 298 (James P. Sterba & Rosemary
Tong eds., 1998) (footnote omitted). This reciprocity strategy is both more practically
operational than Pareto superiority, and more subtle, sensitive, and flexible than
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1984) ("The
difference between Pareto superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is just the
difference between actual and hypothetical compensation.").
170. The "tit-for-tat" strategy is the simplest and most successful solution. See
ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION at viii (1984) ("TIT FOR TAT
is ... the strategy of starting with cooperation, and thereafter doing what the other
player did on the previous move."); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Strategies in the
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, in GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND SThruLATED ANNEALING
32, 32-33 (Lawrence Davis ed., 1987) (stating that the highest score in a prisoner's
dilemma tournament was achieved by the simplest of all the strategies employed,
"TIT FOR TAT"); see also John H. Miller, The Coevolution of Automata in the
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, 29 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 87, 88 (1989) (modifying
the tit-for-tat experiment).
171. See Teck-Hua Ho, Finite Automata Play Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with
Information Processing Costs, 20 J. OF ECON. DYNAMICS AND CONTROL 173, 202
(1996) (demonstrating that even a hostile population prone to defects evolves
towards cooperative behavior).
172. See Charles Koch, Cooperative Surplus, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETillCS
(Lawrence Becker & Charlotte Becker eds., forthcoming 2000).
173. See Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,256 n.2 (1970).
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then attempt to return, also probable, she would face a
formidable procedural apparatus not present when she first
applied. 174 In the continuous procedural "game," which the
particular societal member is most likely to play, individual
interest in the procedural design tends to overlap with the
interest of the community. Justice Black, in his dissent, focused
on this ironic long run impact. 175

III.

ENHANCEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL DESIGN FACTORS

So, we return to Mathews and its progeny in search of
coordination. From the two major interest categories, the
community interests and those of its individual members, emerge
several other categories of factors or "points of sensitivity." A
procedural designer, judge, legislator, or official should consider
each of these points of sensitivity in developing a particular
procedural design. As these factors are more carefully considered,
designers will be better informed as to the mix of procedural
elements that best serve various procedural tasks. Experience,
and whatever objective information that is, or becomes, available,
might in this way be applied to particular procedural design
questions.

A. Cost Factors
Cost may be seen as a factor included in the governmental
program's overall "efficiency." Efficiency is the optimum
allocation of scarce resources, 176 and procedural design should be
efficient in the sense that it optimizes tangible and intangible
resources, including substantive resources, rights, and societal
responsibility. 177 Thus, the system of principles should maximize
174. Prior to Goldberg, the New York procedure made it easy to get on the
AFDC rolls and employed nonformal procedural methods in any challenge. See id. at
257-59 (describing the procedures used). After Goldberg, more formalized procedures
were required. See id. at 270-71 (mandating, for example, that "the decision maker
should state the' reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied
on").
175. "Since this process will usually entail a delay of several years, the
inevitable result of such a constitutionally imposed burden will be that the
government. will not put a claimant on the rolls initially until it has made an
exhaustive investigation to determine his eligibility." Id. at 279 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
.
176. Cf. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 725 (3d ed. 1993)
(defining efficiency as the "capacity to produce desired results with a minimum
expenditure of energy, time, money, or materials").
177. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976) (stating that
"experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the
ultimate additional cost in terms of money and administrative burc;len would not be
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the aggregate of all the values identified herein. But to say that
due process must be efficient begs the question.
Procedures impose a variety of costs on both the individual
and the community. A decision to impose procedures must take
into account these costs. Unfortunately, Mathews focused
attention on a very narrow range of costs-those associated with
governmental process. 178 But procedures impose costs on the
individuals enmeshed in them, often much more daunting to
them than the government's burden is on the community.179
Generally, courts are sensitive to the impact of program
costs injected through procedural and administrative costs. For
example, in considering the constitutionality of the fee limitation
in Veteran Administration benefits proceedings, the Supreme
Court concluded: "[T]his additional complexity will undoubtedly
engender greater administrative costs, with the end result being
that less Government money reaches its intended
beneficiaries."180 Justice Powell, in Mathews, was sensitive to
these costs: "Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the
preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be
found undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the
deserving since resources available for any particular program of
social welfare are not unHmited."181 Thus, the Court is not only
sensitive to costs, but also recognizes that costs are a concern
both for the individuals directly interested in a program and the
community that established the program.
Despite this sensitivity to the costs of procedural decisions,
Mathews analysis is narrowed by its tendency to define costs in
terms of "expense."182 In the three factors, Justice Powell
recognized costs only in terms of "fiscal and administrative
burdens."183 Further, he asserted that "the Government's interest,
and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and
insubstantial").
178. See id. at 348 (stating that the need to conserve scarce fiscal and
administrative resources is an intportant factor that may outweigh the need for
additional safeguards for the individual).
179. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979) ("The parens patriae
interest in helping parents care for the mental health of their children cannot be
fulfilled if the parents are unwilling to take advantage of the opportunities because
the admission process is too onerous, too embarrassing, or too contentious.").
180. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985).
See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
851 (1977) ("[A]utomatic provision of hearings [for transfer of foster children] ...
would intpose a substantial additional administrative burden on the State.").
181. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted).
182. See id. at 347.
183. See id. at 335.

672

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[37:635

administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed. "184
This formulation focuses on a much too narrow understanding of
the costs of procedural moves. Perhaps for this reason, cost
calculations have not been a very compelling reason to curtail
individual process. For example, in Goldberg, Justice Brennan
asserted: "'While the problem of additional expense must be kept
in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the
ordinary standards of due process."'185
The cost factor cannot be limited to monetary allocations.
Indeed, such costs are often the least important. For example, in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform,
the lower court had required a hearing before a child could be
removed from a foster home at either the request of the foster
parent or over the foster parent's objection. 186 The cost here is that
if foster parents must engage in extensive procedures to extricate
themselves from the program, many fewer persons will agree to
serve as foster parents, creating an even greater shortage. In
short, the costs are both tangible and intangible and are of
significant concern to both the community and the individual
members directly affected by the governmental activity.
A proper cost factor must focus on "opportunity costs"-what
is given up in order to make a particular procedural move. 187
Opportunity costs are imposed on both the community and its
members. The opportunity costs of alternative procedures may be
converted into substantive costs. Both the community and its
members face compelling opportunity costs in terms of diverting
energy and funds from the programs' objectives to bureaucrats
and lawyers. Because the individuals directly affected by the
program are in fact affected more directly than the community,
procedural design must allocate resources so as to be particularly
sensitive to both tangible and intangible costs as well as possible
redistribution from a substantive goal of a program to procedural
devices.

184. Id. at 348.
185. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294
F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970)). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971) (holding that "the state
may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of ... [liability] in its
prior hearing").
186. 431 U.S. 816, 850-51 (1977) (holding that the District Court's requirement
that there be an automatic hearing should not be upheld because it would "impose a
substantial additional administrative burden on the State").
187. See ALLAN DESERPA, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS
8 (1985) (defining opportunity cost "as the value of a foregone alternative, usually
the 'next best' alternative").
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Cost also includes the risk of error. Easterbrook, for
example, asserted: "The goal of due process is to hold as low as
possible the sum of two costs: the costs created by erroneous
decisions, including false positives and false negatives, and the
cost of administering the procedures."188 The cost of error in
procedural design itself is difficult for a thoughtful court. In lieu
of objective information, the system tends to bias procedural
design in favor of the most extensive procedure feasible, whether
proven useful or not. Recognizing the problem, the Court often
assures that this instinct for unsupportable formalism does not
act to the detriment of the other factors. 189
In the absence of better information, the question is often
handled as one of allocating the risk of error. For example, in a
case involving commitment procedures for the mentally ill, the
Court concluded: "The individual should not be asked to share
equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to
the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to
the state."190 In order to properly express this cost redistribution,
the Court required more than a preponderance of evidence to
commit the mentally ill.191 In tempering its holding, the Court
observed that an individual, as well as the community, may be
harmed by the incorrect denial of institutionalization. 192
Procedural designers must make careful judgments about
allocating potential error costs among the various interests. 193
Again the procedural questions seep over into substantive ones,
making sensitivity to cost allocation even more compelling.
Each group of procedural designers must engage in
sophisticated cost calculations if their procedural judgments are
to avoid injury to both the community interests and those of its
members. Because a cost calculation must extend well beyond
administrative costs, courts must be inclusive and flexible in

188. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REv. 85,
110 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds., 1983).
189. But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 (1976) (arguing that to consider
the truth or falsity of a government employer's reasons for discharging an employee
to determine the validity of a due process claim "would enable every discharged
employee to assert a constitutional claim merely by alleging that his former
supervisor made a mistake").
190. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
191. See id. at 431 (concluding that a standard between a preponderance and a
reasonable doubt was appropriate).
192. See id. at 429 ("'t cannot be said ... that it is much better for a mentally ill
person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person to be committed.").
193. See Easterbrook, supra note 188, at 110 ("If the goal of the Eldridge
formula is the maximization of society's wealth, why did the legislature not enact
the preferable procedures in the first place?").
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weighing procedural costs. Justification for procedural moves
that impose costs may ultimately be satisfied by reference to the
combined value of the decision to the community and to relevant
individual members. These costs must, however, to the extent
possible, be inventoried and assigned some value.

B. Effectiveness
Effectiveness is, of course, a crucial aspect of procedural
design. The community and its individual members are united in
their concern for effectiveness. Barry v. Barchi, for example,
involved the suspension of a horse trainer whose horse tested
positive for drugs after it finished second in a race. 194 The Court
conceded a "most acute" community interest in "preserving the
integrity of the sport and in protecting the public,"195 an interest
obviously shared by the horse trainers as well. As to the issue at
hand, delay in resolving the trainer's suspension, the Court
observed: "[I]t would seem as much in the State's interest as
Barchi's to have an early and reliable determination with respect
to the integrity of those participating in state-supervised horse
racing."196
Mathews analysis mandates attention to the advantages
anticipated from alternative procedures,197 and procedural
judgments often depend on the perceived impact of a procedural
move. 198 Judgments about effectiveness, however, are difficult.
Objective study of procedures is wholly insufficient to support
most procedural judgments. The contribution of a particular
194. 443 u.s. 55, 59 (1979).
195. Id. at 65.
196. Id. at 66 (finding that the absence of a specified time period in the statute
between the trainer's suspension and post-suspension hearing violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
197. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 ("An additional factor to be
considered here is the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.").
198. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (declining to
enlarge the judicial presence in academia after determining that a hearing was not
likely to improve accuracy in an academic decision); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 851 (1977) (refusing to add procedures
to the decisionmaking process of transferring a foster child and observing that "the
natural parent can generally add little to the accuracy of factfinding concerning the
wisdom of such a transfer"); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985)
(requiring the state to supply a psychiatrist). On the other hand, in the Social
Security recoupment context, an oral hearing was found to be worth the cost where
the absence of fault would justify a waiver of repayment liability. See Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 697 (1979) ("Evaluating fault ... usually requires an
assessment of the recipient's credibility, and written submissions are a particularly
inappropriate way to distinguish a genuine hard luck story from a fabricated tall
tale.") (citation omitted).
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procedural device to effectiveness has proven difficult to
measure. 199 For this reason, Mathews analysis tends to tail off
into a vacuum. Under current learning about the efficacy of
particular procedural designs, procedural designers must rely on
a mix of experience, personal judgment, and theoretical claims. 200
Only in the rarest case might these judgments be informed by
scientific analysis. Because support for objective analysis is
inadequate, the discussion here explores evaluation techniques
that might serve in the absence of sufficient empirical
information about the value of certain procedures.
1. Measuring Effectiveness. Accuracy would seem to be an
obvious effectiveness measure. 201 Accuracy, however, proves to be
a slippery value. For one thing, objective measure of the
accuracy-generating powers of a given procedural element is
illusive. 202 Nonetheless, procedural designers must be sensitive to
at least the goal of accuracy. 203
Accuracy at the first level of analysis is a shared value. In
the proper context, it recognizes the relationship between the
individual's interest and the interest of society. The Court
199. See Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication,
51 LAW & CONTEl\IP. PROBS. 243, 268-71 (1988) (discussing evidentiary values in
light of the questionable value of different types of evidence).
200. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 14 (1979) (relying on a study for the proposition that "[t]he
requirement of a [formal] hearing ... would provide at best a negligible decrease in
the risk of error").
201. See, e.g., McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1997)
("Achieving an acceptable error rate is an important element of the due process
calculus under Mathews ....").
202. JERRY MAsHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS xx (1978)
("Investigation of the accuracy of the [agency's] hearing ... leads very quickly to the
realization that there is no accepted standard for evaluating accuracy.").
203. For example, the Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services based
its judgment on the value of the adversarial process in general, and the value of
counsel on supposition. See 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) ("[O]ur adversary system
presupposes[ that] accurate and just results are most likely to be obtained through
the equal contest of opposed interests ...."). Indeed, the Court expressly recognized
that empirical research did not demonstrate that representation increased accuracy.
See id. at 29 n.5.
Similarly, the Heller v. Doe opinion flounders on the absence of empirical
data regarding procedural efficacy. See 509 U.S. 312, 329 (1993) (wrestling with the
issue of whether relatives and guardians should participate in an involuntary
commitment proceeding). The patients contended that the interest of family
members was adverse to that of the patients and preferred to rely on the state's
determination, without the intervention of relatives. See id. at 330. The Court relied
on the assumption that information from relatives would increase accuracy. See id.
at 331. This assumption was challenged by the patients' representative, who
contended that the relatives' participation would "'skew[] the balance'" against the
patients. Id. at 330.
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recognized the individual's interest in accuracy in Heller v. Doe:
"At least to the extent protected by the Due Process Clause, the
interest of a person subject to governmental action is in the
accurate determination of the matters before the court, not in a
result more favorable to him."204 In resolving the due process
requirements for terminating a mother's rights in Lassiter, the
Court observed that the community ''has an urgent interest in
the welfare of the child, [and that] it shares the parent's interest
in an accurate and just decision."205 The Court summarized the
interaction of the mother's interest and the community's interest:
"[T]he parent's interest is an extremely important one ... [and]
the State shares with the parent an interest in a correct
decision ...."206 The state provides effective procedures for the
benefit of both the mother and the child, and the community
benefits as much or more from the correct resolution of this
dispute. 207
Although ideally it would seem that both the community and
the individual have an interest in accuracy, the individual's
interest in accuracy cannot be calculated in the same way as that
of the community. As observed above, sorting out the individual's
interest to answer the systemic questions of procedural design
depends on whether the individual is in an ex post or ex ante
position. Indeed, it must be recognized that the last thing some
individuals desire is an accurate decision because an accurate
decision will actually deny them what they seek. Still, while ex
post an individual may wish for an inaccurate decision in his or
her favor, individual members are generally served by accurate
. .
. the 1ong run. 208
decisiOns
m
The community always seeks an accurate decision because
only a correct decision can accomplish its program's goals.209
Here, however, the government interest may deviate from the

204. ld. at 332.
205. 452 U.S. at 27.
206. ld. at 31.
207. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979) ("The parens patriae interest
in helping parents care for the mental health of their children cannot be fulfilled if
the parents are unwilling to take advantage of the opportunities because the
admission process is too onerous, too embarrassing, or too contentious.").
208. Refer to notes 167-72 supra and accompanying text.
209. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978)
("Quite apart from its duty as a public service company, a utility [a quasigovernmental entity]-in its own business interests-may be expected to make all
reasonable efforts to minimize billing errors and the resulting customer
dissatisfaction and possible injury."); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971)
(refusing to require an individual to post security against a future judgment where
there was no reasonable possibility of such a judgment being rendered).
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community's interest. Governmental institutions, just as the
individual, may not always benefit from an accurate decision.
But in broad, systemic terms, the community interest is best
served by a firm accuracy goal.210
Still, a simple notion of accuracy cannot suffice as the sole
measure of effectiveness in our legal culture. 211 Studies suggest
that the choice of procedure is a choice between types of
inaccuracy and hence, to some extent, this choice converts the
effectiveness consideration into a question of social policy.212
Saks's empirical analysis suggests that procedures are in fact
often intended to create inaccuracy, and notes examples of law's
"steps at restraining accuracy by actively pursuing
inaccuracy."213 He observes that Thibaut and Walker, in a wellaccepted empirical study, found that the adversarial process
and its rival from the continental system affected the facts
presented to fact finders. 214 They demonstrated that the
"inquisitorial" process used on the continent has disadvantages
in confronting sampling error. 215 "However, this study has
identified a major, and heretofore unsuspected, effect of
adversary decisionmaking: the model introduces a systematic
evidentiary bias in favor of the party disadvantaged by the
discovered facts. "216 That is, the adversarial process creates an
incorrect view of the information balance where the weight of
the evidence clearly rests on one side of the controversy. 217 On
the other hand, another process may create other accuracy bias
as does the "inquisitorial" model. The fundamental procedural
210. See, e.g., Stuart v. United States, 109 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding a low risk of error in the administrative procedure for the cancellation of an
installment land contract because the Bureau of Indian Affairs had provided a
detailed paper record and a right to appeal prior to canceling a land sale).
211. In suggesting reasons why "the law does not pursue a policy of continual
enhancement of the factfinding process[,]" Michael Saks offered, among others, "that
accuracy is not everything, and that reliable and valid factfinding has merely been
trumped by other legitimate values that the law is pursuing." Saks, supra note 199,
at272.
212. See id. at 271-73.
213. Id. at 270 ("Every time the law rejects information that would enhance
factfinding it is at some level choosing to reduce the likelihood of an accurate
result.").
214. See JOliN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 39-40 (1975).
215. See Saks, supra note 199, at 270 (citing THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note
214, at 39) (observing that the inquisitorial model does not compensate for the
possibility of incongruence between the evidence presented and evidence available).
216. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 40.
217. As discussed below, however, this study established that the adversarial
model increased satisfaction. See id. at 77, 79-80 (controlling for background and
cultural differences).
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choice is actually based on the ''brand" of inaccuracy preferred
in the legal culture. In general, our procedural design system is
committed to the adversarial process because it focuses on the
quality rather than the quantity of the evidence.
The community's choice of this procedural model implies a
commitment to a targeted accuracy. Procedural designers might
choose another ''brand" of accuracy, but they should be conscious
that this alternate sense of accuracy might be criticized as
contrary to the community's choice.218 Thus, even in the absence
of sound information about the actual accuracy contribution of a
procedural move, a procedural designer might evaluate that
move as to consistency with the sense of accuracy implied by the
particular community project.

2. Filling the Gap in the Absence of Concrete Information
About Effectiveness. Because objective information about a
procedure's effectiveness is generally unavailable, procedural
design at this point must look to surrogates. In lieu of better data
on effectiveness, procedural designers often resort to
assumptions based on personal judgment and perceived
consistency with our legal culture. This experience, whether
personal or institutional, grounds these assumptions on
something like empirical information. As discussed below,
tradition, as an expression of this experience, provides "data"
about the value of certain procedural moves and this data is
legitimately part of the effectiveness evaluation. Individual or
anecdotal information may have considerable value in guiding
. 219
procedural d es1gn.
Unfortunately, supporting assumptions are often neither self
evident nor sufficiently tested. For example, in Goldberg, Justice
Brennan found that the opportunity for written submission by
welfare recipients was "an unrealistic option."220 Yet he relied on
no objective support. 221 It seems equally likely that oral
218. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 451 (1992) ("The Due Process
Clause does not ... require a State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis
that it may produce results more favorable to the accused.").
219. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 3, at 1274, 1276 (recognizing the sentiment of
the court's desire for a full airing of the facts, cross examination of witnesses, and
the import of a judicial outcome when requiring a hearing).
220. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). Other courts have made
similar assertions. See, e.g., Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 159 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (recognizing the policy reasons behind a hearing requirement and finding
serious procedural deficiencies in the current process that could be alleviated by the
provision of an oral hearing).
221. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268-69 (basing conclusory statements on
assumptions that welfare recipients are uneducated, poor writers).
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presentation will be difficult for otherwise disadvantaged
community members and that the opportunity for written
submissions will make assistance easier and the process more
congenial.222
Many of our legal culture's assumptions are, in fact,
challenged by some of the empirical work that exists. One
fundamental assumption in our system, for example, is that the
decisionmaker who views a witness is the best judge of
credibility. 223 Yet research suggests that, in fact, decisionmakers
actually do a better job of judging credibility through an
evaluation of written memorialization. 224 Similarly, research
shows that even lay decisionmakers are capable of distinguishing
reliable hearsay from unreliable hearsay. 225 Although the
structural combination of decisionmaking within an interested
institution is generally contrary to our legal culture,226 a study
suggested that federal presiding officials feel no greater threat to
222. Justice Brennan's findings in this regard are somewhat curious on their
face. After observing that "[w]ritten submissions are an unrealistic option for most
recipients," Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269, Justice Brennan goes on somewhat
inconsistently to assert: "Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility
of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the
issues the decision maker appears to regard as important." Id. Are rhetorical devices
more valuable to welfare recipients than the opportunity to prepare written
statements in a familiar environment with the possible assistance of
nonprofessionals?
223. See, e.g., Gray Panthers, 652 F.2d at 161 ("Most often mentioned by the
courts is the notion that an oral hearing provides a way to ensure accuracy when
facts are in dispute, especially if credibility is an issue.").
224. See Olin Guy Wellborn Ill, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1087-88
(1991) ("The assumption that nonverbal channels are more important in the
communication of deception than the verbal cues is simply not true."); see also
Margaret A. Lareau & Howard R. Sacks, Assessing Credibility in Labor Arbitration,
5 LAB. LAW. 151, 155-56 (1989) ("Thus, at least some traditional notions about the
relationship between witness demeanor and witness credibility are simply not so.").
225. See Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and
Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1992) ("Proponents of reform argue
'that it is better to admit flawed testimony for what it is worth, giving the opponent
a chance to expose its defects, than to take the chance of a miscarriage of justice
because the trier is deprived of information.' ... This study suggests that jurors are,
in fact, skeptical of hearsay evidence and capable of differentiating between accurate
and inaccurate hearsay testimony.") (footnote omitted).
226. Compare Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1984) (questioning the propriety of immigration judges'
being subject to the influence of the INS's "political leadership"), and Friendly, supra
note 3, at 1279 ("Instead of the Goldberg formulation permitting a welfare official
(even with some involvement in the very case) to act as decisionmaker[,] ... there is
wisdom in recognizing that the further the tribunal is removed from the agency and
thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be the need for other procedural
safeguards."), with Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195-97 (1982) (finding a
presumption of no bias, despite a lack of structural separation, and that any bias
must be proved directly).
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their independence when housed in the agency than when
"protected" from the agency through administrative law judge
status. 227
Absent empirical information, the second best solution might
be the consideration of how procedures should carry out their
functions, rather than relying on personal bias and unsupported
assumptions. Fortunately, some very insightful conceptual
analysis is available. Legal theorists offer some valuable
guidance that might serve in lieu of objective information about
the procedural moves and that might guide incorporation of
whatever empirical information is or will become available.
Fuller offered an indirect method for evaluating procedural
effectiveness: mode of participation. 228 Evaluation of due process
might begin with the "norms" of participation. These norms give
adjudication its moral force as against other processes. 229
Eisenberg focused the search for participation norms on the
reaction of the decisionmaker. 230 He suggested three valuable
norms:
The adjudicator should attend to what the parties have
to say.
The adjudicator should explain his decision in a manner
that provides a substantive reply to what the parties
have to say.
The decision should be strongly responsive to the parties'
proofs and arguments in the sense that it should proceed
from and be congruent with those proofs and
arguments. 231
Indeed, responsiveness to proof and argument distinguishes
adjudication from other types of governmental decisionmaking
processes.
227. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46
ADMIN. L. REv. 271, 277-80 (1994) (citing a survey offederal adjudicators' opinions
about the challenges to their independence).
228. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 364-65 (1978) ("This whole analysis will derive from one simple proposition,
namely, that the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision ....").
229. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the
Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 430 (1978)
(noting that once the relevant legal principles are established, the parties are better
situated to negotiate to a binding decision in spite of any prior incorrect premise
concerning legal obligations).
230. See id. at 411-12 (advocating that the norms of participation are proactive
obligations of the adjudicator).
231. Id.
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What norm of responsiveness might guide evaluation of the
effectiveness? In United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, the Court stated: "The purpose of an adversary hearing
is to ensure the requisite neutrality that must inform all
governmental decisionmaking."232 The decisionmaker must be
clearly receptive to the proof and argument generated by
whatever means, however informal.233 A restraint on
decisionmaker dominance is perceived as a significant "norm."234
Many of the processes prevent information from reaching the
decisionmaker and limit the decisionmaker's range of
consideration.235
Adjudication resolves individual disputes but it also develops
community centered decisions. This second function is obviously
of greater interest to the community than to the individual.236
Effectiveness, then, must also be measured in terms of
facilitating incorporation and growth of community values. This
distinction is important in terms of information the process must
produce. Where the process must generate ''legislative facts" in
order to support the development of community interests, it
should differ from its role of responsiveness to "adjudicative
facts" necessary to resolve individual disputes. 237 Fuller noted
that adjudication has a limited capacity for "polycentric"
problems.238 He offered several situations in which the process is
"dealing with a situation of interacting points of influence and
therefore with a polycentric problem beyond the proper limits of

232. 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993) (criticizing ex parte preseizure proceedings).
233. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 1279 (arguing that the more impartial the
decisionmaker, the "less procedural formality" is necessary).
234. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 119 (suggesting litigants have
a common interest in limiting the control of the decisionmaker).
235. See id. at 121 (recognizing that a requisite degree of disputant control over
the procedure assures the parties full opportunities to present their evidence).
236. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 164 (The Foundation Press,
Inc. 1994) (1958) ("The body of decisional law announced by the courts in the
disposition of these [individual] problems tends always to be the initial and
continues to be the underlying body oflaw governing the society.").
237. See Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 413 (recognizing that the court is
generally limited and bound by the parties' proofs and not free to make an
independent inquiry). Saks suggested that the law intuitively avoids totally
predictable answers in order to assure that judges have sufficient numbers of "data
points" so they may be informed in their lawmaking capacity. See Saks, supra note
199, at 274 ("If the courts have too few cases in their sample, they will not have
enough exposure to social problems to provide effective guidance through wise rules;
if they are overwhelmed by caseloads, they cannot give them the attention necessary
to develop thoughtful law.").
238. See Fuller, supra note 228, at 395.
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adjudication."239 Eisenberg asserted: "Adjudication is an
appropriate ordering process only when decision can be reached
by determining rights through the application of an authoritative
standard."240
Adjudicative-type
responsiveness
is
thus
inappropriate for problems involving "multiple criteria" as well. 241
The participation criteria must vary according to whether
the adjudication focuses more on individual dispute resolution or
on the implementation of community projects. Eisenberg asserted
that if the latter is dominant, then the process should be
"consultative," and not strongly responsive to proof and
argument. 242 Adjudication must, nonetheless, deal with a wide
variety of disputes. In many of these disputes, it must resolve
interacting controversies, and it must apply multiple criteria. In
short, adjudication must develop, or at least glean, societal
values. To the extent these functions are necessary to resolving
the individual dispute, the individual interests are intertwined
with the community interest in a dynamic social ordering.
Procedural design must assure the effective accomplishment of
each of these tasks.
In the absence of information about the particular
procedure's value, procedural design can focus on the appropriate
kind and degree of participation by the necessary individual
community members. 243 It can also analyze the capacity for the
process to be sensitive to broader community values. 244 In short,
procedural design can match participation to the goals of the
process. When Eisenberg's "responsiveness" is key, then the
design should focus on individualizing participation. When,
however, general values become important, design must shift to a
more "consultative" process. Each of these moves, however, must
always be sensitive to both the community's interests and those
of its individual members. Such judgments can be guided by
239. ld.
240. Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 424.
241. See id. at 424-25 (stating that polycentricity involves choices that are
interactive, such as choosing players for different positions on a football team; the
concept of multiple criteria, in contrast, describes choices with no interaction).
242. See id. at 414-23 (reasoning that this path will bear more fruit for the
collective community).
243. But see the value of participation in different decisionmaking models in
Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173, 207 (1997) (valuing participation
because it lends legitimacy, provides information, makes the process fairer, and
forges a greater understanding and consensus about the co=on good).
244. An unfortunate impediment to evolving this understanding is the longstanding law that procedural due process does not apply to rulemaking which, as
discussed below, prevents the courts from participating in procedural development
for that form of decisionmaking. See 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at § 2.20[3].
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whatever information, experience, and thinking is available.
And, as more information about the value of procedural elements
becomes available, these conceptual aspects of effectiveness will
guide the application of that information.

C. The Nature and Extent of the Substantive Impact on the
Individual
By its nature, procedure suggests a norm of substantive
neutrality. 245 A commonality is easier to accept in the procedural
context because the community's goal in that context is
generally some objective substantive judgment.246 A purely
procedural move, then, should not favor a particular
substantive outcome.247
Yet, while separating the resolution of substantive issues
from the process is analytically necessary, the decision's potential
impact on the individual and society must be a factor in the
degree of attention paid to procedural issues. The resolution of
some claims will not compel the same process as those having a
more significant impact even though the individual has the same
level of interest in the outcome in both circumstances. A research
grant, for example, will not justify the same level of process as a
disability claim, even though both are serious matters to the
245. See LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL SYSTEM 250 (1986) ("This test classifies as substantive those laws which
have an effect on primary conduct, on transactions and relationships apart from the
courtroom setting. Those laws which affect only the conduct within the litigation are
classified as procedural."). An example of this valuable method for drawing the
distinction between procedure and substance is the difference between a law that
sets a 30 MPH speed limit, and one that requires an appeal to be filed within 30
days. Although both involve speed, the former is substantive and the latter is
procedural. This distinction works even if some difficulty remains at the margin: See
generally John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693, 726
(1974) (arguing that procedural goals are "concerned only with the most sensible
way to manage a litigation process," but substantive rules are the laws concerning
deterrence and compensation).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 102 F.3d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that "the Government has a legitimate interest in excluding evidence
which is not relevant or is confusing"). However, those litigating against the
government have the same interest over time. Ultimately, both individuals and the
community have an interest in not having irrelevant and confusing information
presented to the decisionmakers.
247. Even assuming that there are many conflicting and incommensurable
conceptions of good, each compatible with the full rationality of human persons, a
workable political conception of justice would mean that procedures, while not
actually attaining neutrality, can at least be evaluated for absorbing the disparate
substantive values, systems, conceptions or principles. See John Rawls, Justice as
Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 223, 248 (1985)
(considering the way in which social unity and stability may be understood by
liberalism as a political doctrine).
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individual claimant. Procedural design must adjust to the impact
of the substantive outcome. 248
Goldberg focused procedural due process analysis on the extent
of the substantive loss. It required an extensive, formal processindeed, a trial-like procedure-for decisions concerning a "grievous
loss."249 This unfortunate formulation forced the Mathews Court to
conclude that the claimant did not face a "grievous loss," even
though there is no useful substantive distinction between the losses
in the two cases. 250 Rather, Justice Powell, in Mathews, needed to
win back the freedom to tailor procedural design according to a
particular program's needs. 251 A doctrine that prescribed trial-like
procedures in every case involving substantial loss was quickly
deemed unworkable. 252 Nonetheless, Powell did include the weight
of the substantive question in his procedural design evaluation.253
The magnitude of the individual interest, while not relevant to
whether it is protected by due process (which is determined by
whether it falls into the category of protected interests), is reflected
. proceduraides1gn.
. 254
m
Still, while the decision has a direct impact on the
individual, it is clear that the community and individual
248. As discussed below, individuals will evaluate the process by its results. See
Dennis P. Stolle et al., The Perceived Fairness of the Psychologist Trial Consultant:
An Empirical Investigation, 20 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 165 (1996) (discussing
participants' perceptions of procedural justice).
249. "The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient
is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss' ...." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
250. Compare Justice Powell's contention: "The potential deprivation here is
generally likely to be less than in Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be
overstated," Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976), with Justice Brennan's
dissent: "[T]he Court's consideration that a discontinuance of disability benefits may
cause the recipient to suffer only a limited deprivation is no argument," id. at 350
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 343 ("[T]here is less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from
the ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an
evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.").
252. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 1299-1301.
253. See id. at 1301-02.
254. For example, in distinguishing Dixon v. Love, another driver's license
suspension case, the Court in Mackey v. Montrym stated:
The private interest involved here actually is less substantial, for the
Massachusetts statute authorizes suspension for a maximum of only 90
days, while the Illinois scheme permitted suspension for as long as a year
and even allowed for the possibility of indefinite revocation of a license.
The duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property interest
is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the
private interest involved.
443 u.s. 1, 12 (1979).
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interests work in tandem. 255 In rating individual interests, for
example, Friendly observed that, ''whatever the mathematics,
there is a human difference between losing what one has and not
getting what one wants."256 This is no less true for the community
than for the individual. The community, like the individual, is
adversely affected when one of its members loses something.
Adjustments must be made in community arrangements to
accommodate the loss, and, hence, the "transaction costs" impose
a deadweight loss on the community.
The substantive impacts add up to increase the demand for
attention to procedural design. 257 The nature and extent of the
substantive impacts affect procedural design regardless of
whether that impact is identified with the community interest or
the interest of the community's members. 258 The crucial point is
that the weight of the impact affects the procedural design and
the weight of the community's interests and its individual
members move in the same direction, if with different magnitude
or velocity.259 What has an impact on the individual, has an
impact on the community; their interests are not truly adverse.
255. Therefore:
Society has a legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from the
consequences of his criminal activity-both from potential physical injury
which may be suffered when a victim fights back or a policeman attempts to
make an arrest and from the downward spiral of criminal activity into
which peer pressure may lead the child.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 266 (1984) (upholding a New York statute
authorizing pretrial detention of juveniles to prevent them from committing other
crimes) (citation omitted).
256. Friendly, supra note 3, at 1296; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska
Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (discussing the "human
difference" between grant of parole and revocation).
257. Friendly observed:
As we go down the [list of various types of government action] from the
more severe actions to the less, the needle would point to fewer and fewer
requirements on the list of required safeguards. With the probable
exception of Goldberg itself, the Court's decisions seem to conform to this
scheme.
Friendly, supra note 3, at 1278-79 (footnotes omitted).
258. However, the general failure to carefully articulate the "government's
interest" in various substantive controversies seriously inhibits this analysis in
procedural design as well. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 937.
259. A disproportionate substantive impact on one or the other must also shape
the procedural design. For example, the Fifth Circuit found that "[w]hen public
safety is an issue, liberty or property interests can be deprived even without a prior
hearing." McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1062 (5th Cir. 1997). A substantive
value such as "public safety" could be seen as the "grievous loss" equivalent in the
community interest calculation calling for special procedural design. As suggested
above, however, these conflicts between ex post individual interests and community
interests do not separate the interests when viewed as part of a continuous
relationship in which the individual ultimately benefits from the community's
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D. Community Maintenance
Community maintenance must be a factor in procedural
design. 260 At first blush, this factor might seem of no concern for
the individual. However, the community's existence is important
to its members. For example, a teenage mother or a permanently
disabled person reaps many benefits from membership in a
community that is sensitive to their needs (whether it expresses
that sensitivity by active government or otherwise). The
community exists to serve the individuals and the individuals
reap the benefit only if the community continues to exist. 261 Thus,
community maintenance is both a community and an individual
value.
Indeed, the procedural design question involves the
community members whose interests are protected or advanced
by the relevant program and hence who stand to gain the most
from being members of the particular community. In recognition
of the individual's interest, for example, the Court found that the
very reason aliens claim due process rights is to remain members
of this particular community.262 A breakdown in a community
sensitive to an individual's special needs would be devastating
for the individuals directly involved, whereas it would be a mere
inconvenience for others. Ironically, then, maintenance of the
particular style of community, may be more important to the
individual than to the community itself. The community's

concern for values such as "public safety."
260. The Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the internal
revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to
protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the
public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food.
. . . [P]rejudgment replevin statutes serve no such important
governmental or general public interest.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
Further:
To protect government's exceedingly strong interest in financial stability in
this context, we have long held that a State may employ various financial
sanctions and summary remedies, such as distress sales, in order to
encourage taxpayers to make timely payments prior to resolution of any
dispute over the validity of the tax assessment.
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 37
(1990).
261. See Becker, supra note 169, at 294 ("I will argue that we can resolve many
conflicts about disability and distributive justice by treating them as coordination
problems.").
262. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (respecting the procedural
rights of a permanent resident alien who was excluded after attempting to smuggle
aliens across the border).
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interest is in its survival; the individual's interest is in the
survival of the particular community that protects or serves his
or her interests.263 Thus, for both the sake of the community's
interests and those of individual members, procedural design
must value community maintenance.

E. Acceptability
Procedural design must seek "acceptability."264 Acceptability
is often expressed as the appearance of fairness. 265 Although
appearance should not compromise other important values, it is
itself a relevant value in the due process system of principles.
Acceptability is at least as important to the community as it is to
the individuals, and in fact may best be characterized as an
inherently community-related factor in the procedural design.
Of course, perceptions about the justice of the outcome itself
affect acceptability by disinterested community members, as well
as those directly affected by the decision. 266 Hence, acceptability
cannot be divorced from cost/effectiveness in procedural design.
Accuracy, however, does not necessarily create acceptability. For
instance, a machine that can be proven to always deliver correct
determinations as to permanent disability at a very low cost, and
little inconvenience to the participants, will not necessarily be
accepted. 267 Certain procedural design characteristics will
See Murphy, supra note 125, at 590. Murphy stated:
If it could be shown ... that even the persons treated unequally will be
better off under the unequal practice than they would be under a practice
that eliminated the inequality, then these persons are in no obvious sense
being exploited for the general welfare. Thus it is by no means clear that
they experience-at least ultimately-any injustice. They are winners too,
and thus they no doubt would have rationally willed such an unequal
practice in a Rawlsian original position.

263.

I d.
264. See Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A
Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4 (1974) ("[A] legal process can be
good, as a process, in two possible ways, not just one: It can be good not only as a
means to good results, but also as a means of implementing or serving process
values such as participatory governance, procedural rationality, and humaneness.").
265. "[J]ustice must satisfy [even] the appearance of justice." Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980) (quoting Offatt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,
14 (1954)).
266. See Stolle, supra note 248, at 165 (observing from a study in which a group
of people was asked to evaluate certain processes that, "[i]n general, case outcome
was a major contributor to participants' perceptions of procedural justice").
267. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 199, at 259. While not offering perfect accuracy,
studies show that the polygraph is better able to detect lying than humans. Yet we
would not replace human factfinders' credibility judgments with polygraph
examinations. Saks observed:
Despite all of their experience and intuition, people are not skilled in the
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improve acceptability regardless of outcome and, given the
difficulty of measuring accuracy, the nature of the process may
be a crucial aspect of acceptability.
Here we need to examine separately those considerations
that affect the acceptability of the process.268 These include
satisfaction, cultural values and traditions, dignity, equality,
and consistency. 269
1. Satisfaction. Procedural design must value participant
satisfaction. The community and its directly affected members
have an interest in the member's satisfaction with the process.
Indeed, in the long run, the community has more interest in
satisfactory treatment of its constituent members than do the
members themselves. While individual members often have only
one experience with a process, the cumulative effect of members'
dissatisfaction would be harmful, even dangerous, to the
community.
Conclusions about satisfaction, however, must go beyond the
intuitive. Unfortunately, as with the other procedural design
aspects, there is little empirical information about satisfaction.
Little experiential "data" has been developed because procedural
designers-courts, officials, and legislators-rarely justify their
procedural decisions in terms of satisfaction. Hence, thinking and
information about satisfaction is largely absent to guide our
procedural design in that regard.
Fortunately, some information about the impact of
procedures on satisfaction is available. For example, Thibaut and
Walker provided an in-depth empirical examination into the
factors that foster satisfaction in a legal process. 270 They
unaided detection of lying. With all of its limitations, the polygraph
examination process, in capable hands, errs less often. Yet the law's
attitude toward this means of credibility assessment is clear. The right and
power of jurors and judges to assess witness credibility intuitively is
strongly protected and preserved-despite the fact that demeanor adds
little to transcripts in terms of accuracy, and despite the fact that some of
the very cues that factfinders are expected to rely upon actually reduce the
accuracy of their assessments.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
268. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666-67 (2d ed.
1988) (recognizing the value of process). Although Tribe distinguishes an
"instrumental" approach from an "intrinsic" approach, see id., the latter generally
corresponding to the "acceptability" category, procedural design can still be guided
by a combination of values that makes use of both approaches.
269. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 46, 54, 57 (listing these values in addition to
the "utilitarian" values he found in Mathews).
270. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 1-3 (summarizing the purposes
of the study); see also Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 752-53 (1976) (describing Thibaut's and Walker's conclusion
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compared the so-called "adversary'' process, the passive
decisionmaker model,271 with its continental rival, the
unfortunately termed "inquisitory" process,272 the active
decisionmaker model. 273 Thibaut and Walker found that "[o]ne of
the most intriguing findings for participant subjects was the
linear increase in satisfaction with the procedure, perceived
fairness of the procedure, and opportunity for evidence
presentation as the procedural mode moved along the continuum
from the inquisitorial to the choice adversary method."274
Uninvolved observers and continental subjects-those not
habituated to the adversarial process-showed a similar
preference for the adversary process.275 This satisfaction
emanates from leveling even though it distorts the true balance
of factual support for one of the positions.276 They also observed
that "subjects are more willing to trust an adversary system than
an inquisitorial attorney to produce accurate, unbiased
judgments."277 That is, participants and observers were impressed
by the adversarial model's restraints on the conduct of the
decisionmakers.
These findings have generalized implications for furthering
satisfaction in procedural design. It is clear that the process for
reaching the decision substantially affects satisfaction. 278 The
crucial advantage of the adversary process, for example, is not
that the adversary system is better than the inquisitorial system because it is more
just).
271. See TH!BAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 22-27.
272. See id.
273. In actual operation, the continental process is very adversarial. The
difference is that the adversariness takes place in the decisionmaking stage rather
than in the information gathering stage. Because the lawyers in the decisionmaking
process tend to be the best lawyers in the system, dialogue at that stage should add
considerably to the validity of the process.
274. TH!BAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 94. Other studies have confirmed
this finding in various settings. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 211-14 (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988).
275. See TH!BAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 77-80.
276. See id. at 77-78 (explaining that "[t]he subjects ... were presumably aware
of the frequent use of adversary procedures in American trials and might have seen
any deviation ... as ... untrustworthy and unsatisfactory").
277. Id.
278. See Kovera, supra note 225, at 720. Kovera noted:
Psychological research . . . suggests that if participants perceive trial
proceedings to be unfair, they will not be satisfied that justice has been
served. This study's results suggest that this concern may be
unwarranted.... This decrease in the level of juror satisfaction ... appears
to be linked to the inadequacy of the hearsay evidence presented in these
conditions.
Id. (footnote omitted) (questioning the validity of the theory that a participant's level
of satisfaction is based on whether trial proceedings are fair or not).
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improvement in perceived accuracy (in fact, it may prove less
accurate than its competitor), but improvement in the
atmosphere of participant control as opposed to institutional
control (even if scrupulously impartial). By the choice of a
general commitment to adversarial individual dispute resolution
process, our community can be said to value satisfaction.
Therefore, a procedural design should reflect this goal.

2. Cultural Imperatives and Tradition. Cultural values
ground our perceptions concerning which process should be
used. 279 In procedural design, as with other aspects of human
process, it is difficult to maintain the existence of universal,
fundamental truths, and hence cultural values must direct
procedural design. 28° Cultural values implicate a vast array of
inquiries into ethics and morality, and quickly reach beyond the
scope of the procedural design context.281 Sufficient here is the
279. See Waldron, supra note 116, at 814 ("In the realm of practical life, we do
not just do things; rather, we have beliefs about what we ought to do, and our actions
are at least in part the upshot of those beliefs.").
280. Cultural values, however, may have less influence on our evaluation of
procedures than might be supposed. See, e.g., THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214,
at 79-80 (providing that satisfaction with the adversary process was the same for
those from other cultures).
281. One dominant inquiry about the relationship between the law and cultural
values has recently formed around the dialogue between liberalism and
communitarianism. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA
IN SEARCH OF A PuBLIC PHILOSOPHY 16 (1996) (observing that liberalism does not
focus on the common good-communitarianism-but that it actually focuses on
which values each individual supports); COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM
(Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 1992); STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT,
LmERALS & COMMUNITARIANS 10 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the communitarian view
that liberal political theory divorces the individual from the end sought); Kenneth
Baynes, The Liberal Communitarian Controversy and Communicative Ethics, in
UNIVERSALISM VS. COMMUNITARIANISM 61 (David Rasmussen ed., 1990) (asserting
that a controversy exists between liberals and communitarians because liberals
focus on rights and communitarians focus on the common good, concepts the two
groups believe do not overlap); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493, 1514 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539, 1566 (1988). Procedural design, as elsewhere, may be guided by Amy
Gutmann's observation: "Communitarianism has the potential for helping us
discover a politics that combines community with a commitment to basic liberal
values." Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF.
308, 320 (1985). The communitarian project may have relevance in procedural
design. To paraphrase Sandel, if concern about aggregate or community values
might undervalue our distinctness, concerns about individual fairness might
undervalue our commonality. MICHAEL SANDEL, LIDERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE 16 (1982) [hereinafter SANDEL, LmERALISM] ("If utilitarianism fails to take
seriously our distinctness, justice as fairness fails to take seriously our
commonality."). My inquiry rests on a coherence between individual fairness and
community. It refers to this dialogue as it might illuminate some overarching values
that might be incorporated into our principles for procedural design. With hopes of
avoiding a digression into the massive and sophisticated literature here, my inquiry
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assertion that the inclusion of cultural values into the system for
procedural design is legitimate and necessary.
More to the point, however, is the understanding that
cultural values affect the weight of both community values and
individual members' values. That is, the two cannot be held
adverse and balanced against each other. Indeed, the cultural
values of a process are more heavily felt by the community than
by the individual.282 For one thing, courts have long assumed that
the overarching community standard is procedural fairness. 283
Statutes are assumed to incorporate fair procedures,284 and the
due process clauses have been read to express a fundamental
community demand for procedural fairness when those statutory
prescriptions fall short. 285 Combined, this law expresses a
can merely advocate mining the dialogue for a robust inventory of community values
as they relate to individual values.
The most controversial aspect of communitarian thinking is the
aggressiveness of the state in generating good values among its citizens, for
example, providing education and other incentives to foster devotion to the
community. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote
Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1350, 1352-53 (1991) (observing that some
attack liberalism as being "devoid of moral substance"); Sheppard, supra note 52, at
1009-10 ("The law should encourage a citizen to live a good life and discourage a
citizen from living a bad life."). "Legal perfectionism" asserts "that the law, through
its sanctions and encouragements, makes it more likely that an individual will live
the life of a good citizen.... [T]he doctrine oflegal perfectionism does not imply the
promotion of any single deontological or natural conception of law." ld. at 1010. The
implication of this dialogue for procedural design may have been expressed by
Vikram Amar: "[A] law may run afoul of substantive due process not because of what
is on the individual's side of the scale, but rather because of the perfectionist aim
that may be on the government's side of the balance." Vikram David Amar, Some
Questions About Perfectionist Rationality Reuiew, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 1029, 1029-31
(1994) (observing that courts may have trouble determining whether the
perfectionist aims are being furthered).
282. See, e.g., SANDEL, LmERALISM, supra note 281, at 149 (observing that
community interests are viewed as either wholly external to individual interests or
only partly internal to the individual).
283. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137-38 (1991) (noting the
Supreme Court's willingness to construe statutes authorizing deprivations of liberty
or property as requiring adequate process).
284. See, e.g., id. at 132-34, 137-38 (explaining that the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 is assumed to incorporate fair procedures).
285. In Arnett u. Kennedy, Justice Rehnquist urged that where the law creating
the due process interest also prescribes procedures, one must accept those
procedures if one is claiming the right derived from that source. See 416 U.S. 134,
153-54 (1974). This approach, however, was not adopted by a majority of the justices
even in Arnett v. Kennedy. See id. at 210-11. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
355, 360-61 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for relying on the
abbreviated procedures provided by the city ordinance to ignore a due process
violation). The "bitter with the sweet" approach has since been consistently rejected
by the vast majority of the justices. For example, the Supreme Court in Vitek u.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1980), and more recently in Cleveland Board of
Education u. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985), soundly rejected the "bitter with
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community standard from which we must extract a foundational
community interest in procedural fairness for the community's
individual members.
A major source of cultural values is tradition, 286 and nowhere
is tradition a more powerful force than in legal procedures.
Tradition, of course, forms the system by which the community
and its individuals measure a process and the foundational
values inherent in a procedural design's acceptance.287 Sherry
concluded: "[O]ur traditions have value, and I would add only
that we must be careful of exaggerating that value."288 Legal
tradition is a very strong motivator in resolving an array of
.
289
procedural quest Ions.
Although tradition is inherently a community value, the
community interest is necessarily intertwined with individual
interests. Our tradition values fairness and sensitivity to
individual community members. The individual interests, on the
other hand, support attention to a community that furthers those
values. 29° From either perspective, then, tradition demands a
commitment to both effectiveness and individual fairness.
Tradition must be a tool and not merely dogma. At present,
tradition has substantial influence on procedural design in part
because of the absence of information regarding the effectiveness
of various procedural elements.291 Incorporating tradition into
procedural design must separate tradition's emotional impact
from the weight of the "data" embedded in tradition. Tradition is,
to some extent, formed by the empirical base of experience. For
example, Justice Scalia observed: "To say that unbroken
historical usage cannot save a procedure that violates one of the
the sweet" approach. Compliance with due process is always at issue regardless of
whether the decisionmakers complied with statutory procedures or not.
286. See Suzanna Sherry, Public Values and Private Virtue, 45 HAsTINGS L.J.
1099, 1099-1100 (1994) (recognizing how powerful the value of tradition is in law).
287. See id. at 1100 (acknowledging the importance of tradition but propounding
that "we must be both willing and reluctant to alter the status quo, avoiding both an
unthinking adherence to tradition and an overeagerness for change").
288. ld. (recognizing many of the observations offered by Novak relating to our
tradition of community values and active government).
289. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (observing that in a
criminal procedure context, the "primary guide in deterolining whether the principle
in question is fundamental is, of course, historical practice"); Connecticut v. Doehr,
501 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1991) (finding a state prejudgment attachment statute to violate
due process because, among other things, it was inconsistent with common law).
290. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 47-48 (furthering the idea that individuals
want the community to foster fairness and sensitivity).
291. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 36 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (conceding that tradition holds value in part because
other alternatives are lacking).
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explicit procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights (applicable
through the Fourteenth Amendment) is not necessarily to say
that such usage cannot demonstrate the procedure's compliance
with the more general guarantee of 'due process."'292
To some extent, tradition is the result of an evolutionary
process in which defects in procedural design have been probed
and experimental correction tested. Ossifying tradition inhibits
the very evolutionary strategy that it might be said to
implement. Nowhere is that more true than in procedural design.
Mashaw, while valuing tradition's evolutionary aspects, observed
its limitations: "The use of tradition as a guide to fundamental
fairness is vulnerable, of course, to objection. Since social and
economic forces are dynamic, the processes and structures that
proved functional in one period will not necessarily serve
effectively in the next."293
The message of tradition, especially as a source of
information about procedural design, is somewhat ambiguous.
Our legal culture is dominated by a model of trial procedures
that evolved from the English experience. 294 The adversarial
process in our system, for example, gains special support from
our own custom and usage. 295 Nonetheless, procedural design
under the due process clauses has had a tradition of flexibility,
moderating this dominance of trial-like procedures. Even as to
the more fundamental notion of adversariness, courts break
free in cases where evidence suggests that traditional
procedural design is outweighed by other factors. For example,
in Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court found that
"frequent and ongoing clinical observation by medical
professionals" may be superior to an adversarial hearing in

292. Id. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). On the other hand, in
Connecticut v. Doehr, Justice Scalia concluded that the Mathews test could
invalidate procedures that were not recognized at common law. See Doehr, 501 U.S.
at 30-31 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also City
of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 242 (1999) ("The notice required by the
Court of Appeals far exceeds that which the States and the Federal Government
have traditionally required their law enforcement agencies to provide.").
293. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 54. Still, tradition must be incorporated into the
system of principles as other than an anecdotal surrogate for data. Although it is
only one factor, it must dominate the others.
294. See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Delaware Cases, 1792-1800, in ESSAYS
IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 489, 508-09 (David H. Flaherty ed., 1969)
(describing the English legal procedures as "new foreign weapons which enabled
[Americans] to fight each other bitterly and endlessly").
295. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137 (1991) (declaring that
Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplated an adversarial
process).
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determining whether an inmate should be given psychiatric
drugs against his will. 296
The founding society cannot be said to have had a dogmatic
vision of those procedures that might comply with the due
process clauses. Indeed, it is more likely that they understood
the Fifth Amendment at least to envision a wide range of
procedural designs. Jefferson, and presumably others, were
familiar with continental procedures and those procedures were
not based on common law procedural assumptions. 297 It might be
that the early designers preferred the English system, but it
must also be true that they recognized that its assumptions
were not universally accepted. The fact that the French, for
example, continued the so-called "inquisitorial process" even in
criminal proceedings after their revolution298 suggests that this
process was not held in great disregard by progressive thinkers
of the time. The meaning of due process envisioned a wide range
of alternatives, and hence the original meaning of that
guarantee does not support a tradition of inflexible commitment
to Anglo-American notions.
Our tradition, as it affects acceptability, moves between the
preference for adversariness, influenced by the Anglo-American
trial model, and the desire to maintain institutional flexibility. 299
Tradition does not dictate trial-like procedures.300 Still, we have a
strong tradition of participant control as opposed to the
continental tradition of decisionmaker control. This tradition is
an example of both the embodiment of experience and the
longstanding emotional commitment inherent in the tradition
factor.

3. Dignity. "Dignity'' here encompasses a variety of related
human elements that should be considered in procedural design.
296. 494 U.S. 210, 231-33 (1990) (recognizing that medical professionals are
superior to the court in determining a patient's method of care); see also Williams v.
Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (11th Cir. 1984) (listing reasons medical
professionals are as competent to make decisions as the court).
297. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1789, at 266 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
298. See Edward A. Tomlinson, The Saga of Wiretapping in France: What it
Tells us About the French Criminal System, 53 LA. L. REV. 1091, 1103-04 (1993)
(discussing France's "inquisitorial" process).
299. Compare Burns, 501 U.S. at 137-38 (preferring adversariness in judicial
proceedings), with Harper, 494 U.S. at 231 (preferring a non-adversarial process in
recognizing that a decision to medicate a patient may be better made by medical
professionals than by a judge).
300. See, e.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 231 ("The Due Process Clause 'has never been
thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained.'")
(quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979)).
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Robert Summers identified dignity considerations as core
"process values."301 Mashaw asserted: ''Whereas the utilitarian
approach [suggested by Mathews] seems to require an estimate of
the quantitative value of the claim, the dignitary approach
suggests that the Court develop a qualitative appraisal of the
type of administrative decision involved."302 Unfortunately,
neither Summers nor Mashaw defined dignity other than
through examples. Mashaw, for example, observed that the
conflict in Mathews affected the claimants' dignity in that a
positive decision validated the assertion that a claimant should
be excused from being a productive member of society, and a
negative decision grouped a claimant among society's duty
shirkers.303
Some sense, however, if not a definition, of the term, seems
necessary here. A useful oversimplification of a sense of dignity is
humanness-those special characteristics that distinguish
humans from other creatures.304 Or perhaps more useful:
humanness includes characteristics the denial of which would
render an individual a lesser category of humanity. Such a view
leaves the value somewhat subjective but sufficiently concrete
and universal for these purposes. If the individual or the
community sees a characteristic as necessary for full status as a
human being, then a threat to that characteristic is a threat to
dignity. Such a threat creates a value to be incorporated in the
system of principles that governs the procedural design.
Eisenberg observed one of the reasons for providing
participatory process even when a decision is not to be made on a
record of proof and reasoned argument: ''Where a decision will
have a serious impact on a discrete set of persons, preservation of
individual dignity points to the desirability of an ordering process
in which those persons will be able to express their view of the
matter to the decisionmaker before the decision is made."305 This
concern is even more compelling in adjudicative decisions covered
by procedural due process, where the decision must be based on
"some kind" of record. Like Mashaw and Summers, Eisenberg

301.

See Summers, supra note 107, at 23 (asserting that respect for human

dignity and fair access to legal processes are inlportant "process values").

302. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis added).
303. See id.
304. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 57
(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785) (observing that
human beings are different from all other beings).
305. Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 417.
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would justify participatory opportunities in procedural design as
those opportunities bolster dignity as a discrete value. 306
Although commentators such as Summers, Mashaw and
Eisenberg focus on individual dignity307-the dignity of the
individual to whom the action is directed-dignity implicates
serious community interests as well. Immanuel Kant firmly
established dignity in our pantheon of primary values.308 Kant's
"dignity'' derives from moral actions: "[S]ince Kant insists it is
not rationally conceivable that anything other than the capacity
for practical reason could be of comparable value, the categorical
imperative requires that human dignity should never be violated
by treating human beings as if they were solely a means to the
ends of others."309 That is, community members have dignity in
the way they treat each other. In this way, dignity is as dignity
does; individuals have dignity in the way they act towards other
community members and not by some characteristic that is
bestowed on them. It is through the community that individuals
"exercise" their dignity, and hence individual dignity is
necessarily intertwined with that of the rest of community. In no
sense are the community's interests and individual dignity
adverse to one another. Indeed, quite the opposite is asserted
here: the community has a profound interest in the dignity of
each of its members.
Procedural design must then assure the dignity of the
individual member. This imperative acquires its force, however,
from the recognition that dignity is a necessary element of
human society. In sum, whatever its other virtues, a procedural
design should not demean those affected.

4. Equality and Consistency. Equal treatment is a core
component of prc;>cedural design. 310 The imperative for equal
treatment tests procedural design in addition to, and to some
extent, in lieu of, correctness. Mashaw found that "lj]ustice in a
306. See id. at 413-14 (affirming that participation in judicial proceedings
increases the dignity of the proceeding).
307. See id. (recognizing the importance of individual participation in the
judicial process); Mashaw, supra note 1, at 49 (concurring that without individuals
participating in the process, dignity will be lost); Summers, supra note 107, at 23
(affirming individual dignity as a value that cannot be lost in procedural design).
308. See KANT, supra note 304, at 42 (designating dignity as a fundamental
value that cannot be bought or replaced).
309. Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETillCS 262, 263
(Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 1992).
310. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 199, at 246 ("[T]he law contains a central thread
that is absent from comparable institutions that engage in similarly complex
decisionmaking: the value of equal treatment.").
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formal philosophical sense is often defined as equality of
treatment. "311 Mashaw continued: "Indeed, insofar as
adjudicatory procedure is perceived to be adversarial and dispute
resolving, the degree to which procedures facilitate equal
opportunities for the adversaries to influence the decision may be
the most important criterion by which fairness is evaluated.',s12
Equality in procedure is often expressed in terms of
consistency. If the process cannot assure correctness, it can at
least assure that like cases are treated alike.313 Administrative
law strongly favors consistency.314 Commentators have seen
consistency as a vital check on arbitrariness.315 A study of Social
Security decisions, for example, developed a list of characteristics
that were shown to predict expected outcomes against which
actual decisions could be evaluated statistically.316 The Fifth
Circuit found that a process can be judged to have contributed to
accuracy because of its tendency to generate the same results in
similar cases.317 Procedural design might then be evaluated based
on its ability to generate consistent and/or predictable outcomes
in similar procedural categories.
The acceptability of a process also depends on its consistency
with similar processes throughout the greater system. For
example, after concluding that Connecticut's prejudgment
attachment procedure violated common law procedures for such
actions, the Court added: "Connecticut's statute appears even

311. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 52.
312. ld. at 52 (footnote omitted).
313. See Saks, supra note 199, at 246 ("The unusual difficulty of finding a
criterion against which to test the correctness of trial outcomes and the special
concern in the law for equal process lead to an emphasis on reliability, rather than
validity, in evaluating the working of the law."). "[T]he law ought to strive to treat
like cases alike (reliability) and, if possible, to make the correct decision on those
similarly treated similar cases (validity)." ld. at 245-46 (footnote omitted).
314. See generally 2 KOCH, supra note 1, at 255-59.
315. Yet neither due process nor equal protection have convinced the
government to change its position. See, e.g., Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985
F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (positing that due process does not prevent the
government from refusing to satisfy reasonable expectations created by past
policies); Seven Star, Inc. v. United States, 873 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A
claim that an administrative agency has made different decisions in different cases,
in different years, does not give rise to a claim for relief on equal protection
grounds.").
316. See MAsHAW ET AL., supra note 202, at 14 ("[G]iven a relatively short list of
characteristics of a case, a computer program can predict with a high degree of
accuracy whether the case will be an award or a denial.").
317. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp., 38 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (5th Cir.
1994) (asserting that the district court's failure to hold a sanctions hearing did not
deny due process to the sanctioned attorney).
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more suspect in light of current practice.'ms The Court noted that
nearly every state provided a greater number of attachment
procedures.319 Thus, equality of treatment of similar individuals
among procedural systems affects the evaluation of the process.
These individual-interest-oriented senses of equality do not
capture the true sense of equality as a community value. Our
community demands equality as a procedural value, but with a
twist that disconnects individual justice from this sense of
equality. Modern procedural jurisprudence is founded on a
"liberalism" that concedes a plurality conception of good. This
liberalism supposes, as Rawls expressed it, "that there are many
conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the good, each
compatible with the full rationality of human persons, so far as
we can ascertain within a workable political conception of
justice.'.a2o Procedure then, if not itself value neutral, can be seen
as absorbing disparate substantive values or principles. That is,
conflicting and incommensurable values are given appropriate
consideration within the decisionmaking context. This is the
sense of equality that makes sense under modern conditions.321
As discussed above, the incommensurability of rights is
hotly debated and well beyond the scope of this work or its
author. 322 Here, we need to assert only that the procedural
design system must envision a "flexible" sense of equality
because rights might be incommensurable. Rawls may have
offered a practical equality test under such conditions: the "veil
of ignorance.''323 The Thibaut and Walker empirical study
summarized:
318. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 17 (1991).
319. See id.
320. Rawls, supra note 247, at 248.
321. Cf. id. at 245. Rawls further declared:
[L]iberalism assumes that in a constitutional democratic state under
modern conditions there are bound to exist conflicting and
incommensurable conceptions of the good.... This does not mean, of course,
that such a conception [of justice] cannot impose constraints on individuals
and associations, but that when it does so, these constraints are accounted
for, directly or indirectly, by the requirements of political justice for the
basic structure.

I d.
322. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 88, at 1170 (explaining that incommensurability
might be seen as "the incomparability of options or choices").
323. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 24 n.27 (1993). In one defense of
the usefulness of the "veil of ignorance," a concept first propounded in Rawls's A
Theory of Justice, Rawls observed:
We model [a disconnection between "people's comprehensive doctrines" and
"the content of the political conception of justice"] by putting people's
comprehensive doctrines behind the veil of ignorance. This enable [sic] us to
find a political conception of justice that can be the focus of an overlapping
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[S]ubjects behind the veil adopted a perspective that led
them to prefer (and to judge as fair) systems they
believed to favor the disadvantaged, while tending to
preserve equal access to channels of information and to
mechanisms of control. The principles of fairness in legal
procedures developed in our simulation of the original
position therefore correspond rather well with those
postulated by Rawls as the likely objects of agreement in
the ideal original position.324
In sum, "equality" as a community value requires a procedural
system biased towards the disadvantaged.
The community's interest in equality is somewhat different
from that of any given individual's, but no less intense. Our
community's interest in "equality" in procedural design is to
assure some advantage for those least able to participate without
unduly
comprormsmg
the
effectiveness
and
overall
responsiveness of the process. This community value will add
weight to certain procedural imperatives beyond that apparent if
all individuals are considered literally equal in the procedural
system.

N. APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES
In application, as in concept, the goal is to coordinate, in
procedural design, the community's interests with those of its
individual members. The above factors, as points of sensitivity,
provide a context for the coordination of these major categories of
interests. This section suggests how these factors may be applied
in developing individual procedural designs. Because design will
necessarily be affected by the perspective of the designers, this
section ends with some observations about how those perspectives
might manifest themselves and perhaps be adjusted by this
approach.

A. Three Implications for Procedural Design

A system of principles derived from the above-discussed
factors could operate to improve due process design in three basic
ways. First, the principles could alert designers as to the weight
to be given to the procedural issues within the bundle of issues
presented for resolution. Second, the system could evolve

consensus and thereby serve as a public basis of justification in a society
marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism.

I d.
324.

THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 115.

700

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[37:635

categories of procedural questions in order to transfer general
learning to particular procedural design tasks. Finally, these
principles could affect the design by identifying the dominance of
a particular concern that should be given priority in a particular
procedural design.
1. The Relative Importance of Procedural Design in
Context. The first-level implication of the above analysis is that
community and individual interests, previously seen as adverse,
should be seen as supporting each other. Together, they add
weight or velocity to the demand for procedure. That is, if
quantitative measure were possible, this analysis would add
rather than subtract community and individual interests. This
combined weight can be evaluated relative to the other
(substantive) issues presented.
An analysis of the combined weight of the community
interests and those of individual members will affect the
judgment concerning the procedural question seriousness. As
discussed above, a fundamental failing in all procedural analysis
is the lack of objective information about the actual impact of a
specific procedural element; nonetheless, judgments must be
made. Designers will be informed as to the intensity of their
concern over procedural design under current conditions of
uncertainty about the procedure's value and effectiveness. The
interests' combined weight will determine allocation of resources
to the procedural aspects of the decision. Thus, for example, if the
individual interest in the decisionmaking process is substantial,
but the community interest is small, attention to process issues
may be less compelling than if both the individual interest and
the community interest are substantial.
It is important to remember that each decision involves a
resolution of a bundle of issues. Appropriate procedure is one
category within that bundle. Assigning weight to the procedural
issue tells the decisionmaker how much attention to devote to
procedural design. The decisionmaker, for example, could
determine that the procedural issues, when the individual and
community interests are coordinated, are very weighty. After
careful consideration, however, and not in disagreement with the
above determination, the decisionmaker could still design a fairly
informal process because such a process serves the relevant
substantive interests of both the community and its members
best. 325
325. The classic example is Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) ("Many
requirements essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with ....
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2. Recognizing Groupings of Factors to Evolve Categories of
Procedural Designs. The above is sort of a gross implication: the
combined weight of the community interests and those of the
community's members describes the importance of the procedural
issues. The coherence, however, of these two types of interests, as
they relate in applying the factors identified above, has a more
subtle effect on procedural design. As has been shown above,
each factor has implications for both the community and the
individual, and each procedural element potentially serves both
interests. Thus, not only will the combined weight of the two
interests designate the procedural issues' importance in a given
decisionmaking context, but evaluation of the coordinated
interests will inform procedural design in a particular context.
The task is to develop categories of procedural questions for
which answers continue to evolve. Remembering that
categorization is a creative and dynamic process, and that
sometimes evolution involves the balancing of interests and the
trade-off of the factors discussed above, a system of principles
should emerge in which a procedural designer will understand,
under particular conditions, that certain procedures will
coordinate all the factors, optimizing the community interests
and those of its individual members. Simplistically, learning will
evolve which tells a procedural designer that where the
particular decisionmaking undertaking faces x set of factors, the
best procedural design will be understood to include y set of
procedural elements. The procedural designer will be expected to
make his or her own contribution, so that application in the
specific case will generally contribute to the evolution of
procedural design principles. Specific categories will capture this
development and serve as the springboard for new applications
and further development.
Again, the development of this understanding is made
difficult by the absence of objective information concerning the
actual implications of certain procedural choices. Procedural
designers, however, are not without tools to begin an evolution of
a more precise procedural design system. An array of judicial
thinking is embodied in the cases. Designers now depend on
experience and judgment. Tradition, as an embodiment of
experiential data, also supports the process. Legal theorists, such
[A] hearing in its very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the
right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof,
however informal."). See also Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31
(1981) ("[T]he State shares with the parent an interest in a correct decision, ... and,
in some but not all cases, has a possibly stronger interest in informal
procedures ....").
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as Fuller and Eisenberg, discussed above, help reason through
judgments about the procedural goals in a particular context.
Procedural designers, judges and officials in particular,
would make a substantial contribution to this experiential base
by taking more care in justifying individual procedural moves. At
this point, it is impossible to recommend more than this:
procedural designers should articulate the factors they find
controlling and how they hope their procedural choices might
improve the particular procedural design's performance. Careful
identification of the points of sensitivity in a procedural design
will sharpen procedural design and advance the development of
the law.326 More to the point, efforts to coordinate, or sometimes
to trade-off, these two categories of interests as expressed within
the above factors will advance procedural design. As this process
evolves, procedural designers, perhaps with the aid of better
empirical support, will compare the mix of factors in the case
before them with a similar category of cases.

3. Special Concerns May Affect the Final Design. Adding
detail to procedural design will also recognize that the dominance
of either community interest or individual interest may affect
procedural design. This observation recalls the form of balancing
in which all interests survive, but some are given greater weight
than the others. Here, however, while both interests must be
reflected in the procedural design, one type of procedural design
may better serve one interest than the other. The dominance of
one interest may affect the final design, but not to the detriment
ofthe other.
The recognition that the two interests have separate, as well
as combined, weight allows fine-tuning of the design. The
procedural designer may reach certain conclusions regarding the
general procedural mix of what best serves the coordinated
interest of the major interests, but may also recognize that the
design must additionally concentrate on one of the lesser interests.
From considering the above values, the procedural designer might,
for example, adopt a procedure that serves the community's
interest even if it does not serve the individual's. Still, to the
extent possible, a design weighted toward one interest should
avoid diminishing its performance relative to the other.
Although the principle of coherence must recognize that
sometimes a process serving one interest will not optimize
326. Such an articulation of the procedural design task will inform the research
task as well as the application task. With the clear need exposed, the motivation for
empirical study of procedure may become more obvious.
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service to the other interest, it at least forces the procedural
designer to recognize both categories of interests. The
community and its individual members are in a continuous
relationship, and the overarching goal of the design is
coordination of community and individual interests.
Cooperation among individuals in such a relationship optimizes
their interests and justifies their commitment to the
community. Moreover, as argued above, the vitality of the
particular community that supports the particular program is
generally of interest to the individuals affected by decisions in
those programs. In short, procedural designers must recognize
the coherence of interest, even if in one context the individual
interests and community interests compete.
For example, Fuller's participation thesis was limited to
adjudication by the dominance of individual rights. 327 As has been
seen, however, the community has an interest in participation by
its individual members. Fuller recognized the limitation of his
approach, and hence invented the concept of "polycentric"
tasks. 328 To illustrate, he provides examples in which "we are
dealing with a situation of interacting points of influence and
therefore with a polycentric problem beyond the proper limits of
adjudication.',a29 In these not rare circumstances, individual cases
cannot be resolved without dealing with other "tensions." The
individual controversy exists in the community context. The
community and its other members cannot be excluded without
violating principles of participation. Eisenberg adds the problem
of "multiple criteria," criteria that cannot be confined to
individual disputes, because, in our terms, those disputes
necessarily implicate community values.330 Eisenberg solves the
problem by propounding a system of degrees of "responsiveness"
to proof and argument. In his system, then:
[R] esponsiveness runs on a continuum from a relatively
restrictive and constraining norm, as in classical
adjudication, to the more diffuse norm of serving the
public's needs that is a general aspiration of democratic
institutions. Similarly, participation runs on a
continuum from cases in which all persons who are
directly affected by a decision have a right to participate
327. See Fuller, supra note 228, at 357.
328. See id. at 394 (defining "polycentric" tasks as multiple implications of one
decision).
329. Id. at 395.
330. See Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 424 (admitting that an individual's
problem and its subsequent resolution affect not only the individual, but also the
community as a whole).
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in its formulation, as in negotiation, to cases in which
participation may occur but is not institutionally defined
. Iegis
. Ia t·1on.331
and assure d , as 1n
The source of dissatisfaction of these careful legal process
observers is, in our terms, coordination of community interests
and specific individual interests. As here, they are not contending
that these broader interests are adverse to the resolution of the
individual dispute; rather, they are hunting for a way to inject
these other valid interests without diminishing the individual
interests. These observers are, in short, trying to resolve the
problem present here. They are not attempting to trade off these
interests. As to individual dispute resolution, adjudication (with
attention to both Fuller's polycentric problem and Eisenberg's
multiple criteria), can be explained by sensitivity to the unity
between the community interest and that of the community's
members. Acceptance of the observation here that community
interests are coherent with individuals members' interests allows
the system to deal with this problem with some precision.
Eisenberg, for example, recognizes that the "consultative" process
of administrative rulemaking serves the community interests
discussed above without being constrained by a rigid
requirement of careful attention to proof and argument, or
"strong responsiveness."332
Due process law, somewhat more intuitively, excludes
rulemaking from its coverage.333 This exclusion is a gross
response to the dominance of the community interests. The
suggested analysis allows for an adjustment in which the
dominance of the community interest and needs of the
community's individual members in the decisionmaking can be
accommodated without diminishing one interest to the benefit of
the other. Such an approach supports due process doctrine for
rulemaking, and similar generalized participatory concepts build
around the needs of this category of decisionmaking tasks and its
inherent community dominance. Although the fear of
inappropriate judicial choices cautions against this move, the
prospect of positive gains not only for individual interests, but
also for community values as described above, support it.

331. Id. at 431.
332. See id. at 415, 417 (suggesting that some participation, even if the
decisionmaker is not bound, serves dignity and the value of a well-informed
decision).
333. See 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at§ 2.20[3].

2000]

DUE PROCESS CALCULUS

705

B. Perspective of the Designers
The system of principles suggested above must ultimately be
implemented by procedural designers. These designers should be
guided by the need to work with the above factors toward a goal
of so coordinating the interests of the community and its
individual members. The factors discussed above, as they
incorporate the two major interest categories, should help
procedural designers think through a particular design.
Nonetheless, the designers' perspective cannot be ignored.
The due process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution provide the foundation upon
which judicial interpretation-especially in the last quarter of
the twentieth century-has evolved a sophisticated procedural
jurisprudence. There are, in addition to these foundational
prescriptions, an array of statutory provisions that establish a
variety of procedural designs. Among these are the generalized
provisions of the state and federal administrative procedure acts.
Our procedural system involves a rather complex interaction
among these sources of procedurallaw.334 While this article has
focused on due process jurisprudence, conceptually it can inform
any institution engaging in procedural design-legislators and
bureaucrats, as well as courts.
Nonetheless, procedural design undertaken outside the
context of an individual decision has a different focus than does a
design evaluation as applied in a specific case. Designer
perspective is affected by whether the design is contemplated
before individual application, or evaluated after individual
decisions. Thus, procedural designers may be classified as either
ex ante (legislators and officials), or ex post (the courts).
Procedures are prescribed before the program begins in the
legislation (although usually very superficially), and in the
procedural rules and pronouncements of the administrators.
Additionally, these ex ante procedural designs are in place when
an individual decision is made. The procedures may be evaluated
by the courts after they are used to make the individual decision,
and this ex post evaluation focuses on the procedures as they are
performed in a particular context. The perspective from the two
distinct design stages creates biases that the coordination of
interests would uncover and perhaps mitigate.
It is often observed that a procedural design's evaluation is
distorted by the fact that courts, the ex post designers, have their

334.

See generally 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
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attention drawn to a very specific individual circumstance.335 This
perspective heightens the tension between the community
interest and the now adverse individual interest, masking their
coordinate interests. The courts are not unmindful of the
community interests in procedural design, but they often overemphasize the obvious individual interests at the expense of the
more subtle community and nonparty individual interests. The
system of design must inform these ex post designers regarding
the interrelation of the factors in evaluating a process. By
informing the ex post designers-the courts-such a system will
increase their sensitivity to the larger context, ironically, by
making them more sensitive to the full range of individual
interests.
Ex ante designers necessarily focus on both the community
interests and those of an abstract, aggregate individual member.
These designers may not see the context in which their broader
task is intertwined with all individual interests. It is perhaps
here that the recognition of the coordination of interests will
have greater effect because these designers will focus on
procedural design as it expresses the community's interest in its
individual members. Indeed, the most conspicuously absent
players in procedural design are often the legislators. Perhaps
the above strategy will motivate these ex ante designers to
understand that procedural design, as well as substantive
program design, implicates community interests.
A goal of coordinating the two major categories of interest
may also mediate the conflict between the ex poste and ex ante
designers. The allocation of authority over procedure between
the legislators, administrative authorities, and the courts,
creates a continuous tension. This tension is evident in the case
law. In Arnett v. Kennedy, for example, the Court seemed to
adopt a position, taking the "bitter" prescribed procedures with
the "sweet" entitlement. 336 It is, however, the ex ante
designers-Congress, in this case-who have the dominant
authority over procedural design, and hence their design would
be presumed valid in a due process attack. The Arnett
335. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 97, at 322. Nagel states:
[T]he importance of governmental policies is evaluated by judges with a
kind of tunnel vision.... Any particular governmental policy can be made
to seem unnecessary or unimportant or even senseless if it is detached from
the institutional and social web that gives it meaning. The result is to
systematically favor individual interests over collective interests.

I d.
336. 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (explaining that participants must take "the bitter
with the sweet" when procedures establishing rights are hurtful in themselves).
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presumption has not been continued and was soundly rejected
in Loudermill. 337
Easterbrook asked: "If the goal of the Eldridge formula is the
maximization of society's wealth, why did the legislature not
enact the preferable procedures in the first place?',:l38
Easterbrook's rhetorical question supports the ''bitter with the
sweet" approach of Arnett in that it supports the notion that the
courts should not impose additional procedures because the most
cost-effective procedures are by definition provided by ex ante
decisionmakers. Referring to the legislative judgment regarding
these two costs, he asserted: "That they choose not to use these
procedures is strong evidence that their costs outweigh their
benefits."339 The justification for the bitter with the sweet doctrine
would be more plausible in the rare situation in which there is
some evidence that the political authorities actually attempted to
coordinate interests. Given the general absence of care in
procedural choices, and the undeniable judicial expertise in that
area, courts should be active participants, even with respect to
community interests.340 In other words, while courts must be
active procedural designers in order to support and adjust ex
ante procedural design decisions, they must also concern
themselves with optimizing community, as well as individual,
interests.341 The coherence asserted above suggests that a judicial
failure to coordinate these interests will endanger both
categories.
The interaction between the ex ante and the ex post
procedural designers will evolve procedural categories that will
optimize the several factors as they serve both community
interests and those of the community's individual members.
Generally, the political institutions are thought to best define the
community interests. In Mathews, Justice Powell accepted this
idea in the procedural context: "In assessing what process is
337. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1985). See
also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, in which the Court refused to defer to the
state legislature's judgment regarding a ban on advertising, and placed the burden
of proof on the state to show that the restraint would further a substantial
community interest. 517 U.S. 484, 505, 516 (1996).
338. Easterbrook, supra note 188, at 110.
339. Id. See also Pierce, supra note 3, at 1999 ("[L]egislatures and agencies are
likely to do a better job of choosing appropriate procedures through application of
the Eldridge test than courts have done.").
340. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 920 ("Judicial restraint is not legitimately
employed as a one-sided tool to limit rights; it must operate to limit asserted
governmental interests as well.").
341. See Sheppard, supra note 52, at 984 ("[T]he Court must individually
determine the governmental interest supporting each argument brought by the state
and federal governments.").
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due ... , substantial weight must be given to the good-faith
judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the
administration of. . . programs that the procedures they have
provided assure fair consideration ... .'.a42 The courts should be
sensitive to their shortcomings in judging relevant community
interests even as they rely on their expertise in procedural
design. 343
Nonetheless, the courts should be active procedural
designers. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has inhibited this
evolutionary process by ordering great deference to the
procedural judgment of the ex ante procedural designers. For
example, Vermont Yankee placed authority in the ex ante
designers-Congress and the relevant agency-and thus gave
their designs a presumption of validity in a case in which
statutorily prescribed procedures are challenged. 344 The allocation
between the ex post and ex ante designers, however, is now
unclear because of the contrast between the consistent adherence
to Vermont Yankee (presumption favoring the ex ante design in
statutory challenge) and Loudermill's firm rejection of the
presumption favoring ex ante design m constitutional
challenges.345
The judicial strategy should meld the courts' role with that
of ex ante procedural designers rather than describing
boundaries of authority. In doing so, the courts should remain
sensitive to the legislative goals and administrative tasks.
Although judicial expertise in procedural design is conceded, the
recognition that procedural design carries a heavy dose of
community values suggests a formative role for the legislators
and officials. Indeed, under certain circumstances, courts might
well demand that legislators resolve procedural design issues
just as they sometimes force the legislators to resolve
fundamental substantive policy issues.
342. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
343. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 920 ("Judicial restraint ... requires more
judicial awareness of the competing interests heaped on the scales. In this respect, it
is necessary to reconsider the mandated deference to legislative judgment in the
rational basis test ....").
344. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (declaring that, absent constitutional
conflicts, government agencies should be able to make their own rules and
procedures); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) ("A State ... has no
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
classification."); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1981) (stating that, absent
"constitutional constraints," Congress has the power to "prescribe rules of evidence
and standards of proof' for the federal courts).
345. See 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at § 2.34.
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The Loudermill and Vermont Yankee lines of cases could do a
better job of allocating procedural lawmaking authority. The
allocation of authority over procedural issues rests with both the
policymaking entities-legislators and agency officials-and the
courts. Dominance shifts according to the institution that is best
able to make judgments about the relevant values. While
conceding that community and individual interests mutually
support each other, the allocation of authority may depend on the
respective weight of the two interests. Often a legislature or
administrative entity will be in a better position to design
procedures that respond to these values than are the courts.
Courts should give such procedures more deference if they are
based on a coordination of the community and individual
interests.
Thus, interaction between the ex ante and ex post
procedural designers should evolve procedural design categories.
These categories will incorporate the points of sensitivity
explored above. Through this process, the procedural designers
will utilize and improve a range of procedural designs.

